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INTRODUCTION 
“To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are 
voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an 
unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds.”—
Justice Robert Jackson1 
 
Sports are an essential part of American society. For example, baseball 
often is referred to as America’s pastime.2 Every summer, ballparks across 
the nation are filled with energetic fans of all ages cheering for their 
favorite team. Many of our childhood memories encompass little league 
games, high school sporting events, and watch parties for the Super Bowl 
and the World Cup. Our childhood idols often are sports legends, such as 
Hank Aaron, Babe Ruth, and Muhammad Ali. Many Americans view 
sports as a venue to teach cherished values, such as teamwork, dedication, 
and work ethic. 
Despite the multitude of sports available to play and watch, football is 
arguably one of the most popular and lucrative sports in the world. The 
National Football League (“NFL”) reached $14 billion in revenue in 2016 
alone.3 High school football programs are an integral part of the NFL 
landscape because they serve as a training ground and pipeline for children 
with aspirations of playing in the NFL.4 As a result, high school student-
athletes often mimic the very players they seek to become. Students wear 
their favorite player’s jersey, team colors, and other types of paraphernalia. 
But what happens when students mimic their sports idol’s social protests 
during sporting events? What happens when social activism enters the 
world of youth sports? High school players across the nation illuminated 
this issue when they began to mimic a NFL player, Colin Kaepernick, and 
                                                                                                             
 1. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). 
 2. Micah Chen, America’s Pastime: 20 Reasons Baseball Will Always Hail 
Over Football, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 25, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com 
/articles/676720-americas-pastime-20-reasons-why-baseball-will-always-hail-over 
-football [https://perma.cc/ZYM3-TJMW]. 
 3. Daniel Kaplan, NFL revenue reaches $14B, fueled by media, SPORTS 
BUSINESS DAILY J., Mar. 6, 2017, at 4. 
 4. See, e.g., Edwin Weathersby, NFL Pipeline: Long Beach Poly Second 
Among High Schools for Most Active NFL Players, FOX SPORTS WEST (Sept. 5, 
2017, 5:59 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/west/story/nfl-pipeline-long-beach-
poly-second-among-high-schools-for-most-active-nfl-players-091517 
[https://perma.cc/D6W4-JW7J]; Julian Sonny, The 10 High Schools That Produce 
The Most NFL Players in America ,  ELITE DAILY  (May 27, 2014), 
https://www.elitedaily.com/sports/10-high-schools-produce-nfl-players-america  
/608500 [https://perma.cc/7M6G-WS4L]. 
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his teammate’s act of kneeling during the national anthem in protest of 
police brutality against African-American males.5 Although the First 
Amendment protects Kaepernick’s symbolic act, many high school players 
across the nation did not receive the same constitutional protection for 
mimicking his national anthem protest.6 On the contrary, school leaders 
usurped the young athletes’ constitutional rights by disciplining student 
protesters through school and game suspensions.7 First Amendment 
jurisprudence clearly provides students in K-12 public schools with freedom 
of expression rights as long as such acts do not create a material disruption to 
the school learning environment.8 Under the Material Disruption Standard, 
school administrators are not permitted to limit a student’s First Amendment 
rights unless the expression causes a substantial disruption to the school 
learning environment or interferes with the rights of others.9 Courts defer to 
                                                                                                             
 5. Bob Cooke, High School Athletes Join Colin Kaepernick In Anthem 
Protests; Angry PA Announcers Don’t, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2016, 10:05 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2016/09/11/high-school-athletes-join-colin- 
kaepernick-in-anthem-protest-angry-pa-announcers-dont/#65179ea77ea1 [https://per 
ma.cc/7STT-U5QQ]. 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”); Knowles Adkisson, In Louisiana High School Players Link 
Arms, But Do Not Kneel During the Anthem, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-louisiana-high-school-players-link- 
arms-but-do-not-kneel-during-anthem/2017/09/29/9f893f40-a564-11e7-ade1-76d0 
61d56efa_story.html?utm_term=.91ae8c2b378e [https://perma.cc/9NLD-NSY6]. 
This Article highlights the controversy surrounding high school athletes being 
disciplined for kneeling during the national anthem. A Louisiana principal issued a 
letter to students threatening to suspend any student from the game or team that knelt 
during the national anthem. The American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana issued 
a statement expressing that the principal’s national anthem policy violated a 1943 
Supreme Court case, West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which held that 
public schools may not coerce students to stand during patriotic rituals. This Article 
highlights the growing debate regarding Kaepernick being afforded his constitutional 
right to engage in symbolic protests during the national anthem while high school 
students are being denied those same rights. See infra Part I.A.–B. 
 7. Christine Hauser, High Schools Threaten to Punish Students Who Kneel 
During the National Anthem, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2017/09/29/us/high-school-anthem-protest.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc 
/C9SJ-J9N6]. 
 8. Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still 
Standing, 58 AM. U.L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2009); see also Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 9. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
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school administrators’ discretion in determining whether a student’s conduct 
has caused a material disruption to the school learning environment.10  
This Article examines the intersection of high school sports, social 
protest, and the law. Although the majority of public discourse has centered 
on professional sports,11 it is imperative also to consider the impact of national 
anthem protests on high school athletics—especially in light of the 
“Kaepernick Effect.” The Kaepernick Effect refers to the wave of student-
athletes who, during school athletic events, are mimicking NFL player Colin 
Kaepernick’s act of kneeling during the national anthem in protest of the 
treatment of black Americans and people of color.12 The students, like 
Kaepernick, are attempting to utilize sporting events as a platform for social 
activism.13 Because high schools are an essential part of the pipeline to 
professional sports, the appropriateness of social activism in the school 
context is a crucial part of this national debate.14 This Article argues that 
student-athletes have the constitutional right under the First Amendment to 
engage in protests during patriotic rituals, such as the national anthem. Thus, 
any subsequent discipline is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has stated 
that “[t]he vigilant protection of First Amendment freedoms is nowhere more 
vital than in our nation’s public schools” because public schools serve as a 
training ground for our nation’s future leaders and promote the preservation 
of our democracy.15 Overzealous school administrators cannot be allowed to 
infringe on students’ First Amendment freedoms under the guise of school 
discipline. It is vital to our democracy that public schools promote a 
marketplace of ideas by encouraging students to express their diverse 
perspectives openly as opposed to proselytizing them to ascribe to a particular 
orthodoxy.16 Although national anthem protests performed by students could 
cause a material disruption to school sporting events because of opposition 
from spectators, the preservation of First Amendment rights should supersede 
any limitations on those rights which are enforced to avoid discomfort or 
thwart the dissemination of unpopular views.  
                                                                                                             
 10. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. 
L. REV. 1027, 1030 (2008). 
 11. See infra notes 34, 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 12. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 13. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 14. Jamilah King, Why high school players protesting the national anthem is 
great patriotism, MIC (Sept. 16, 2016, 9:43 PM), https://mic.com/articles/154333 
/why-high-school-players-protesting-the-national-anthem-is-great-patriotism#.iu 
Y5Tzpfj [https://perma.cc/U8UZ-GZJ2]; see also supra note 4. 
 15. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). 
 16. The Brave New World of Fear: Public Education, 15 LEGAL NOTES 
EDUC. 1 (2003). 
2017]  FROM HOODIES TO KNEELING DURING THE NATIONAL ANTHEM 149 
 
 
 
The existing Tinker Material Disruption Standard,17 which has served as 
the guiding principle for determining whether a school official may limit 
symbolic speech rights for students in K-12 schools, should be interpreted 
differently to better protect students’ free speech rights when the conduct in 
question occurs outside of the school learning environment. Under the current 
Tinker standard, school authorities may limit First Amendment freedom of 
expression if the symbolic speech causes a material disruption to the school 
learning environment or interferes with the rights of others.18 This criterion is 
highly subjective because a material disruption to one school administrator 
may not be classified as such by another. As a result, the application of the 
Tinker Standard in relation to national anthem protests during K-12 sporting 
events has been inconsistent, leaving students’ free speech rights to the whims 
of capricious school administrators.19 Furthermore, the Tinker Material 
Disruption Standard should be interpreted narrowly to apply only to symbolic 
speech that occurs within the school learning environment. The current 
interpretation of the Tinker standard is antithetical to the spirit and purpose of 
                                                                                                             
 17. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
In Tinker, the Court emphasized that students do not shed their constitutional 
rights at the schoolhouse door. Under the Tinker standard, schools may not limit 
students’ First Amendment freedom of expression rights unless: (1) the 
expression causes a substantial disruption to the school learning environment; and 
(2) interferes with the rights of others. Id. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Evie Blad, Can schools punish students for protesting the national 
anthem?, PBS (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/schools-
students-protesting-national-anthem/ [https://perma.cc/RK7G-6XCT]. Whether 
students who choose to kneel during the national anthem are disciplined largely 
depends on whether the school administrator approves of the symbolic conduct, 
with little consideration for the students’ First Amendment rights. For example, 
students attending Parkway High School in Louisiana who choose to kneel during 
the national anthem will be punished by being removed from the team, whereas 
students attending Centerville High School in Ohio are permitted to kneel during 
the national anthem without fear of disciplinary action. The principal of 
Centerville High stated, “I personally am disheartening [sic] when people [kneel 
during the national anthem] but that’s because I choose to stand so that people 
have the right to freedom of expression and if they choose to kneel then that’s 
what I’m standing for.” Dana Smith, High school on students kneeling during 
national anthem, WDTN (Sept. 29, 2017, 6:15 PM), http://wdtn.com/2017/09/29 
/high-school-on-students-kneeling-during-national-anthem/ [https://perma.cc/4P 
9Z-KVA7]; see also Jacob Bogage, Louisiana high school will kick students off 
team if they don’t stand for national anthem, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/09/28/louisiana-high- 
school-will-kick-students-off-team-if-they-dont-stand-for-national-anthem/?utm 
_term=.5c2e87159f4a [https://perma.cc/NC9J-NLYR]. 
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the First Amendment and leaves students’ constitutional freedoms to the 
abuse of discretionary power by school authorities.  
This national anthem controversy is representative of the vicissitudes of 
political controversy that have inundated the K-12 landscape as school 
authorities struggle to strike a balance between patriotism and constitutional 
freedoms. Students’ symbolic speech rights in K-12 public schools—both 
inside and outside of the classroom setting—must be clarified. This Article 
proposes a new K-12 standard that applies the full protections of the Spence 
Test20 for student-initiated symbolic speech with the Material Disruption 
Standard from Tinker v. Des Moines.21 Currently, the Spence criteria is used 
primarily in the context of adult freedom of expression cases and the Tinker 
Standard is applied exclusively to the K-12 schooling context.22 Because the 
Spence standard is used to ensure that adults like Kaepernick receive the full 
protections of the constitution, we should extend the same level of protection 
to students in K-12 schools to safeguard their freedom of expression rights.23  
                                                                                                             
 20. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974). 
 21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 22. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1989) (citing Spence, 
418 U.S. 405 in the context of freedom of expression of an adult violating an anti-
flag desecration statute); Laura Prieston, Note, Parents, Students, and the Pledge 
of Allegiance: Why Courts Must Protect the Marketplace of Student Ideas, 52 B.C. 
L. REV. 375, 383 (2011) (“At present, the holding of Tinker has not been overruled 
and still protects the First Amendment free speech rights of students in public 
schools.”). 
 23. The Tinker Material Disruption Standard is too narrow and thus fails to 
safeguard students’ free speech rights. The Spence Test, however, promotes 
expansive free speech rights but fails to consider the “special characteristics” of 
schools in assessing First Amendment rights. If students truly do not shed their 
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door, then the theoretical gap between 
Tinker and Spence must be addressed by the adoption of my proposed new 
constitutional theory, the Tinker-Spence standard. See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. 
at 506 (“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of 
the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom 
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (“[T]he constitutional rights of students in public 
school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings.”); Jonathan Pyle, Comment, Speech in Public Schools: Different Context 
or Different Rights?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 586, 590 (2002) (“When considering 
the constitutionality of a school speech regulation, one need only ask, ‘As a matter 
of constitutional law, would the expression be protected if it was made by an adult 
in an analogous situation?’ If the answer is yes, then ask, ‘Is the school context 
different in relevant ways so that the same protections ought not apply?’ This 
approach respects students as constitutional persons, promotes the value of 
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In Spence v. Washington, the Court held that symbolic speech qualifies 
for First Amendment protection if: (1) the actor/speaker intends to convey a 
particular message; and (2) it is likely that those who witness the activity will 
understand what the speaker intends to convey by his or her behavior.24 Lower 
courts have adapted this two-part criteria, known as the Spence Test, to 
ascertain whether expressive conduct qualifies as symbolic speech.25 
Concomitantly, the Tinker Material Disruption Standard permits school 
authorities to infringe on students’ freedom of expression rights if the 
symbolic speech causes a material disruption to the school learning 
environment or infringes on the rights of others.26 The proposed new 
constitutional standard, the Tinker-Spence Test, combines aspects of the 
Spence Test and Tinker Material Disruption Standard to safeguard students’ 
freedom of expression rights while still considering the special characteristics 
of K-12 schools.27 Under the proposed Tinker-Spence Test, symbolic speech 
in K-12 public schools is protected if: 
                                                                                                             
consistency, employs a broad base of legal precedent, and leads to relatively 
consistent results. Lower courts follow this approach in some areas of student 
rights, but not in others . . . .”). 
 24. Spence, 418 U.S. at 415. 
 25. James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to 
Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2008) (“The appealing functionality of Spence’s 
test has made it the more common approach used by the lower courts to identify 
whether expressive conduct will be treated as symbolic speech.”).  
 26. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.  
 27. Several landmark Supreme Court cases that address free speech rights in 
K-12 schools consider the “special characteristics of schools” when determining 
the deference afforded to school administrators to limits students’ First 
Amendment rights. Although the Court does not define explicitly the “special 
characteristics” referenced, one can infer that the Court is referring to the 
attendees, which consists of minors who collectively may be considered a 
vulnerable population. See generally Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 
(1981) (discussing that the Court’s inquiry is shaped by the educational context 
in which it arises). The Court stated, “First Amendment rights must be analyzed 
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.” Id.; Bd. of Educ., 
Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 853 (1982) 
(“While students’ First Amendment rights must be construed ‘in light of the 
special characteristics of the school environment,’ ibid., the special characteristics 
of the school library make that environment especially appropriate for the 
recognition of such rights.”); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (“First Amendment rights, 
applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are 
available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 
50 years.”). 
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(1) The actor/speaker intends to convey a particular message;  
(2) Those who witness the activity likely understand what the speaker 
intends to convey by his or her behavior; 
(3) Symbolic speech does not interfere with the rights of others; and 
(4) Symbolic speech does not involve peer coercion of other students 
to participate. 
This Article offers a prospective path toward safeguarding students’ First 
Amendment free speech rights in K-12 schools by bridging the doctrinal gap 
between Tinker and Spence through the adoption of the Tinker-Spence 
Standard. In doing so, this Article seeks to make an important contribution to 
constitutional scholarship by clarifying and better safeguarding students’ 
freedom of expression rights in K-12 schools.  
Part I discusses Colin Kaepernick’s contentious national anthem protest 
and the controversy that followed, as high school students began to mimic his 
social activism. Part I also highlights the intersection of social activism and 
sports and the implications of this relationship for public school students. Part 
II provides an overview of free speech jurisprudence in K-12 schools. Part III 
critiques the inadequacy of current law and proposes the adoption of a new 
constitutional standard, the Tinker-Spence Test, to K-12 school environments 
to govern students’ symbolic speech rights. This Article concludes with a brief 
discussion of the importance of promoting civic education through the 
preservation of student freedom of expression rights. 
I. SOCIAL ACTIVISM ENTERS THE WORLD OF HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS:  
THE COLIN KAEPERNICK EFFECT 
Historically, social activism and social movements have been used as a 
catalyst for social, cultural, and political change.28 Social movements are 
premised on the belief that a group of individuals with similar values on a 
particular issue can change the status quo through action and advocacy.29 
Some displays of social activism are more controversial than others.30 For 
example, Breanna Stewart, a member of the Seattle Storm Women’s National 
Basketball Association (“WNBA”) team, engaged in social activism by 
wearing a t-shirt to the Nickelodeon Kids Choice Sports Awards with the 
words “Wild Feminist” printed on the front to help bring attention to gender 
                                                                                                             
 28. Stacey B. Steinberg, #Advocacy: Social Media Activism’s Power to 
Transform Law, 105 KY. L.J. 413, 420 (2017). 
 29. Id. at 421. 
 30. Mitchell Nemeth, Using Sports As a Platform for Social Activism, 
MERION WEST (Oct. 21, 2017), http://merionwest.com/2017/10/21/using-sports-
as-a-platform-for-social-activism/ [https://perma.cc/3WL3-8UN9]. 
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equality.31 Stewart’s act was met with little to no opposition.32 Other acts of 
social activism, however, such as Colin Kaepernick’s kneeling during the 
national anthem, have created a world of controversy by igniting passionate 
conversations on the relationship between free speech rights and social 
activism in sports.33 This section discusses the growing influence of social 
activism in sports, with a particular emphasis on professional and high school 
football. 
A. The Rebirth of Social Activism in Sports: The Evolution of the Kaepernick 
Effect 
On August 26, 2016, Colin Kaepernick, a quarterback for the San 
Francisco 49ers, added his name to a growing list of NFL players and athletes 
using their names and platforms to bring publicity to an issue they want to 
bring to the forefront of public discourse.34 Colin Kaepernick’s social protest 
is not a new phenomenon; in fact, some of this nation’s most iconic moments 
of social activism have occurred during sporting events by professional 
athletes. Some of the most well-known instances of professional athletes 
engaging in social activism include the following events: Muhammad Ali’s 
                                                                                                             
 31. Lindsay Kramer, Breanna Stewart finding an activist voice as loud as her 
game: ‘Why are you not speaking up?’, SYRACUSE, http://www.syracuse.com 
/sports/index.ssf/2017/07/breanna_stewart_finding_an_activist_voice_thats_as_ 
loud_as_her_game.html (last updated July 18, 2017, 2:27 PM) [https://perma.cc 
/6EH5-FVY6]. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Lucy Rock, As Women’s Sports Grows, Athletes Find They Can’t Stay Silent 
In the Era of Trump, GUARDIAN (July 29, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardi 
an.com/sport/2017/jul/29/womens-sport-activism-and-political-protest-planned-parent 
hood [https://perma.cc/A7V5-J7Q5]; see also discussion infra Part I.A.; Timothy L. 
Epstein, The Relationship Between Sports and Social Activism, CHI. DAILY LAW BULL., 
Jan. 6, 2015, at 1.  
 34. The number of professional athletes kneeling during the national anthem 
continues to grow since Colin Kaepernick’s historic protest. For example, the 
following professional athletes have engaged in national anthem protests: San 
Francisco 49ers linebacker Eli Harold, WNBA player Kelsey Bone, soccer player 
Megan Rapinoe, Denver Broncos linebacker Brandon Marshall, and Miami 
Dolphins players Arian Foster, Michael Thomas, Kenny Stills, and Jelani Jenkins. 
Lindsay Gibbs & Aysha Khan, Tracking the Kaepernick Effect: The Anthem 
Protests are Spreading, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 20, 2016, 4:15 PM), 
https://thinkprogress.org/national-anthem-sports-protest-tracker-kaepernick-284f 
f1d1ab3e/ [https://perma.cc/TN4R-LD4F].  
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refusal to be drafted during the Vietnam War;35 the “Black Power salute” 
during the 1968 Olympics by medalists Tommie Smith and John Carlos;36 
and, more recently, Colin Kaepernick’s refusal to stand during the national 
anthem.37 
The Kaepernick phenomenon has permeated other NFL teams as well as 
other professional sports. For example, Kenny Stills of the Miami Dolphins 
and Marcus Peters of the Kansas City Chiefs also participated in national 
anthem protests during NFL games.38 Likewise, United States soccer player 
Megan Rapinoe kneeled during the national anthem to protest racial injustice 
                                                                                                             
 35. In 1967, boxing champion Muhammad Ali refused to be drafted to fight 
in the Vietnam War, citing religious reasons for his decision. As a result, he was 
stripped of his heavyweight boxing title, convicted of draft evasion, and sentenced 
to five years in prison. Ali appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, arguing 
that he qualified for conscientious objector status because his refusal to enter the 
draft was based on his Muslim faith. Muhammad Ali’s conviction eventually was 
overturned by the Supreme Court on a technicality. See Clay v. United States, 403 
U.S. 698 (1971); see also Krishnadev Calamur, Muhammad Ali and Vietnam, 
ATLANTIC (June 4, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06 
/muhammad-ali-vietnam/485717/ [https://perma.cc/4K67-6MZP]. 
 36. Tommie Smith and John Carlos sparked world controversy when they 
gave the Black Power salute as they stood on the awards podium at the 1968 
Olympics in Mexico City. Their symbolic act was in protest of the inequality in 
the United States for black Americans. The backlash for their social activism was 
swift and severe. Both men were suspended from the United States Olympic team, 
vilified by their communities, and received countless death threats. See Joshua 
Haddow, We Interviewed Tommie Smith About the 1968 ‘Black Power’ Salute, 
VICE (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ex5mz7/the-story-
behind-the-1968-salute.team [https://perma.cc/KLU9-8BCX]. 
 37. See Mahita Gajanan, Colin Kaepernick and a Brief History of Protest in 
Sports, TIME: SPORTS (Aug. 29, 2016), http://time.com/4470998/athletes-protest-
colin-kaepernick/ [https://perma.cc/D2VG-VJXH]. Significantly, a professional 
athlete’s decision not to stand during the national anthem is not entirely new. In 
1996, the NBA almost suspended Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf for his decision not to 
stand during the national anthem because it conflicted with his Islamic belief 
system. Abdul-Rauf’s stance ultimately led to his early departure from the NBA. 
See Eddie Maisonet, Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf: Here, gone and quickly forgotten, 
SBNATION (Mar. 25, 2014, 9:50 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/2014/3/25/5544 
920/mahmoud-abdul-rauf-nuggets-national-anthem [https://perma.cc/T65D-2ESM].  
 38. NFL players who protested during the national anthem in Week 11 2016, 
ESPN (Nov. 20, 2016), http://www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/221815 /nfl-
players-who-protested-during-the-national-anthem-in-week-11 [https://perma.cc/3 
ZYY-6THB]. Both NFL players, Kenny Stills of the Miami Dolphins and Marcus 
Peters of the Kansas City Chiefs, kneeled during the national anthem to protest 
police brutality. Id. 
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in the United States in support of Kaepernick’s stance.39 In a post-game 
interview following the protest, Rapinoe stated, “I am disgusted with the way 
he has been treated . . . and [the] hatred he has received in all of this . . . . We 
need a more substantive conversation around race relations and the way people 
of color are treated.”40 Notably, the WNBA, after intense criticism, reversed its 
decision to fine athletes for wearing shirts with “#BlackLivesMatter” and 
“#Dallas5” hashtags41 printed on the front.42 Additionally, Barbara Barker of 
Newsday wrote, 
Although much of the recent activism has centered around Black 
Lives Matter, there has been a growing political awareness for several 
years with athletes using their platform to try to effect social change. 
Jason Collins became the first active athlete in one of the four major 
U.S. professional sports leagues to come out as gay, a number of 
athletes have spoken out about LGBT rights, Aaron Rodgers took on 
                                                                                                             
 39. U.S. soccer star Megan Rapinoe kneels during national anthem, CBS 
NEWS (Sept. 4, 2016, 10:48 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-soccer-star 
-megan-rapinoe-kneels-during-national-anthem-colin-kaepernick/ (“‘It was a little 
nod to Kaepernick and everything that he’s standing for right now. I think it’s actually 
pretty disgusting the way he was treated and the way that a lot of the media has 
covered it and made it about something that it absolutely isn’t. We need to have a 
more thoughtful, two-sided conversation about racial issues in this country.’”) 
[https://perma.cc/SPL3-KMRC]. 
 40. Soccer player Megan Rapinoe kneels as ‘nod to Kaepernick’, ESPN (Sept. 
7, 2016), http://www.espn.com/espnw/sports/article/17467341/nwsl-seattle-reign-us-
women-national-team-player-megan-rapinoe-national-anthem-kneel-nod-san-francis 
co-49ers-quarterback-colin-kaepernick [https://perma.cc/KK44-WN2T].  
 41. Black Lives Matter is a social activist movement whose mission is to 
build local coalitions to address violence against black communities by addressing 
things such as police brutality. See About, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://black 
livesmatter.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/23GP 
-9EPH]. The Dallas 5 is a reference used to acknowledge and honor the five fallen 
Dallas police officers that were ambushed during a peaceful demonstration 
regarding recent police shootings involving black civilians in the city of Dallas. 
See Powerful Mural Honors Slain Dallas Police Officers, FOX NEWS INSIDER 
(Aug. 1, 2016, 10:37 AM), http://insider.foxnews.com/2016/08/01/mural-honors-
slain-dallas-police-officers-see-powerful-photos [https://perma.cc/BT2V-W7UN]. 
Notably, hashtags are labels used on social media sites like Twitter or Facebook 
to represent content on a particular topic. Individuals often use hashtags on social 
media sites to signal that they are sharing relevant information on a particular 
topic, such as poverty or unemployment.  
 42. Alicia Adamczyk, The WNBA Reverses Fine for Black Lives Matter 
Warm Up Shirts, MONEY: SPORTS (July 25, 2016, 1:54 PM), http://time.com 
/money/4417237/wnba-black-lives-matter-fine/ [https://perma.cc/B532-SXKU]. 
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a fan who shouted an anti-Muslim remark and Ed O’Bannon sued the 
NCAA on behalf of college athletes.43 
Notably, following Kaepernick’s act of kneeling during the national 
anthem, other players have engaged in other acts of symbolic protests, such 
as sitting, holding up raised fists, and locking arms.44 Although 
Kaepernick’s protest during a NFL game is one example in a long history 
of social activism in sports, the nature of his protest—kneeling during the 
national anthem—is arguably one of the most controversial acts in the 
history of professional sports.45 Kaepernick’s act provoked a national debate 
about the appropriateness of social protests in professional sports.46 
Professional athletes engaging in social protests have been categorized as 
“disrespectful” or “unpatriotic” by some fans while others applaud them for 
using their names and platforms to bring publicity to important social 
issues.47 The heart of the debate, however, has centered around patriotic 
symbolism and the sentiment that all Americans should stand during the 
national anthem to honor the men and women of the armed forces.48 
Therefore, many viewed Kaepernick’s symbolic act of kneeling during the 
national anthem as unpatriotic and disrespectful to the men and women of 
                                                                                                             
 43.  Barbara Barker, Athletes no longer afraid to speak out on social issues, 
NEWSDAY: SPORTS (July 15, 2016, 8:35 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/colum 
nists/barbara-barker/athletes-no-longer-afraid-to-speak-out-on-social-issues-1.12050 
846 [https://perma.cc/8HEY-BYS4]. 
 44.  Sophie Tatum, Athletes, activists spar on kneeling National Anthem protests, 
CNN (Sept. 28, 2017, 4:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/27/politics /cnn-nfl-
kneeling-protests-town-hall-ac360/index.html [https://perma.cc/E65N-JVDG]. 
 45. Colin Kaepernick’s symbolic act of kneeling during the national anthem 
in protest of police brutality is distinct from other historical incidences of social 
activism in sports because Kaepernick’s act sparked a movement within American 
sports. Specifically, Kaepernick’s protest inspired athletes from all types of sports 
and levels—high school and collegiate sports, for example—to join his efforts to 
bring attention to police brutality. Significantly, one of Colin Kaepernick’s San 
Francisco 49ers teammates, safety Eric Reid, expressed support for Kaepernick 
by joining him in taking a knee during the first kneeling protest. See Mark 
Sandritter, A timeline of Colin Kaepernick’s national anthem protest and the 
athletes who joined him, SBNATION (Nov. 6, 2016), http://www.sbnation.com 
/2016/9/11/12869726/colin-kaepernick-national-anthem-protest-seahawks-brandon- 
marshall-nfl [https://perma.cc/XA5B-J2HR]. 
 46. Tatum, supra note 44.  
 47. Jennifer Angiesta, CNN Poll: Americans Split on Anthem Protests, CNN 
POLITICS (Sept. 30, 2017, 2:49 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/29/politics 
/national-anthem-nfl-cnn-poll/index.html [https://perma.cc/9J4J-X264]. 
 48. Howard M. Wasserman, Symbolic Counter-Speech, 12 WM. & MARY 
BILL OF RTS. J. 367, 368–69 (2004). 
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the armed forces who risk their lives to keep the United States safe.49 
Members of the military and ordinary citizens vehemently expressed their 
disapproval of Kaepernick’s act.50 Opponents of Kaepernick’s actions also 
contended that social protests should not be a part of the sporting milieu 
and argue that spectators should be able to watch their favorite team play 
without being subjected to political and social controversy.51 Conversely, 
those who championed Kaepernick’s protest argued that he simply was 
exercising his constitutional right to freedom of expression by using his 
public persona to bring attention to police brutality against black 
Americans—an important social issue.52  
Despite the criticism, these athletes are lawfully exercising their First 
Amendment freedom of expression rights. While people across the nation 
debated the appropriateness of Kaepernick’s protest, a silent movement 
was slowly building in high school football. High school students across 
the nation began to mimic Kaepernick’s example by kneeling at football 
games during the national anthem in protest of police brutality.53  
                                                                                                             
 49. Katie Couric, Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Trump, Kaepernick and her lifelong 
love of the law, YAHOO (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.yahoo.com/katiecouric/ruth-
bader-ginsburg-on-trump-kaepernick-and-her-lifelong-love-of-the-law-132236633  
.html [https://perma.cc/4HZJ-YCRD]; see also Ryan Wilson, Esiason on Kaepernick 
sitting: ‘It’s about as disrespectful as any athlete has ever been,’ CBSSPORTS (Aug. 
31, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/esiason-on-kaepernick-sitting-its-
about-as-disrespectful-as-any-athlete-has-ever-been/ [https://perma.cc/NS2W-C 
3DR]. 
 50. Paul Szoldra & Christopher Woody, What Some US Troops Really Think 
About Colin Kaepernick And Kneeling During the National Anthem, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Sept. 25, 2017), http://taskandpurpose.com/troops-kaepernick-national-
anthem-trump/ [https://perma.cc/8KKW-2BC8].  
 51. John O. McGinnis, Social Norms, Not the Constitution, Should Regulate 
Protests at Sport Ceremonies, LIBRARY OF LAW AND LIBERTY (Sept. 18, 2016), 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2016/09/18/social-norms-not-the-constitution-should-
regulate-protests-at-sport-ceremonies/ [https://perma.cc/BGJ3-5TD5]. 
 52. Athena Jones & Tom LoBianco, Obama: Colin Kaepernick ‘exercising 
constitutional right’, CNN (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/05 
/politics/barack-obama-colin-kaepernick/ [https://perma.cc/8K2P-QBWY]; see 
also Chris Biderman, Colin Kaepernick is exercising his rights, whether you agree 
or not, NINERS WIRE (Aug. 27, 2016), http://ninerswire.usatoday.com/2016/08/27 
/colin-kaepernick-is-exercising-his-rights-whether-your-agree-or-not/ [https://perma 
.cc/M7UL-2YW3]. 
 53. Student Protests During National Anthem & Pledge: A Resource & 
Timeline, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST CENSORSHIP, http://ncac.org/students-protesting 
-during-anthem-pledge-a-resource-timeline (last visited October 22, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/CE3T-SLA7]. 
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B. The Emergence of Social Protests in High School Sports and 
Disciplinary Consequences 
As news of Colin Kaepernick’s protest began to move across the 
country, it was only a matter of time before student-athletes attending K-
12 schools followed suit. Many school administrators found themselves 
thrust into a world of controversy as their respective communities reacted 
to the student-athletes’ social protests during school sporting events.54 
Specifically, school authorities struggled to determine the correct response 
to students’ symbolic expression during the national anthem.55 School 
authorities either could discipline students for engaging in a national 
anthem protest or support students’ conduct as an exercise of their 
constitutional freedom of expression rights. Either course of action placed 
school administrators at risk of public backlash and criticism from the 
communities in which they serve. 
School authorities expressed various reactions to student national 
anthem protests. Some school administrators expressed public support for 
students while others issued sanctions or swiftly implemented policies 
prohibiting national anthem protests during school sporting events. For 
example, the Oakland School District in California retweeted news stories 
and supportive messages on the district’s official Twitter page in 
acknowledgement of students’ rights to engage in social activism during 
school-sponsored sporting events.56 Additionally, coaches, parents, and 
teachers throughout the country joined student protests during the national 
                                                                                                             
 54. Eric Russell, High school athletes, officials confront national anthem 
protests, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Sept. 26, 2017), http://www.pressherald.com 
/2017/09/26/high-school-athletes-and-officials-confront-national-anthem-protests/ 
(“High school athletes, coaches and administrators across Maine are grappling 
with the increasingly bitter debate over whether kneeling during the national 
anthem is an acceptable form of protest.”) [https://perma.cc/7BKX-96CG]; see 
also Kyle Neddenriep, Some Indiana High Schools Weigh Pregame Protest 
Phenomenon, INDY STAR, https://www.indystar.com/story/sports/high-school/2017 
/09/28/some-indiana-high-schools-weigh-pregame-protest-phenomenon/712907001/ 
(last updated Sept. 28, 2017, 5:01 PM) (“[T]his is as polarizing of an issue as he has 
seen in his time as an administrator. ‘I’m afraid of what could happen, . . . . What 
happens if adults in the bleachers get mad? You’ve got a bad situation on your 
hands. It’s an emotional topic.’”) [https://perma.cc/KAF6-GV2M]. 
 55. See Blad, supra note 19. School administrators had different 
interpretations regarding whether students kneeling during the national anthem 
was protected speech or unprotected speech that warranted disciplinary action. As 
a result, some students were disciplined for kneeling during the national anthem 
while others were permitted to engage in the symbolic conduct. See id. 
 56. Id.  
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anthem.57 For example, in Seattle, the entire high school football team at 
Garfield High School, including the coaches, kneeled during the national 
anthem in protest of social injustice.58 The Seattle Public School System 
responded to the players’ protest in a public statement that declared that 
“[s]tudents kneeling during the national anthem are expressing their rights 
protected by the First Amendment. Seattle Public Schools supports all 
students’ right to free speech.”59 Similarly, the entire football team from 
Woodrow Wilson High School in New Jersey, including their coaches, 
protested during the national anthem to display their solidarity with Colin 
Kaepernick and his efforts to increase awareness about police brutality.60 
As the trend of national anthem protests continues to permeate the 
high school sports milieu, some school administrators are supporting 
students’ symbolic expression while others are resistant and respond with 
swift, harsh punishments, characterizing the student protests as defiant and 
disrespectful.61 As a result, the punitive responses to student national 
anthem protests range in severity and scope. For example, Mike Oppong, 
a football player at Doherty High School in Massachusetts, received a one-
game suspension for kneeling during the national anthem in solidarity with 
Colin Kaepernick to protest police brutality against people of color.62 
Similarly, another student, Bishop Gorman, was suspended from his 
Nevada high school and placed on a disciplinary contract for kneeling 
during the national anthem.63 Although these two instances of disciplinary 
action occurred on opposite sides of the country, they both represent the 
disturbing trend of impermissible content regulation of student speech by 
state officials.64 Unfortunately, the harsh responses to individuals 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. 
 58. Q13 Fox News Staff, Entire Seattle high school football team kneels during 
national anthem before game , Q13  FOX (Sept. 16, 2016, 10:37 PM), 
http://q13fox.com/2016/09/16/entire-seattle-high-school-team-kneels-during-nation  
al-anthem-before-game/ [https://perma.cc/79KK-PSH6]. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Rachaell Davis, This High School Football Coach Planned To Kneel Alone 
During National Anthem – Then This Happened, ESSENCE (Sept. 12, 2016), 
http://www.essence.com/2016/09/12/high-school-football-team-knee-support-kaeper 
nick [https://perma.cc/EWF7-HPD9]. 
 61. Blad, supra note 19. 
 62. Emmett Knowlton, High school player suspended for kneeling during 
anthem has suspension lifted after public outcry, BUS. INSIDER: SPORTS (Sept. 12, 
2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/high-school-football-player-suspended-kneel 
ing-during-national-anthem-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/MS67-CJRN]. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See Student Protests During National Anthem & Pledge: A Resource & 
Timeline, supra note 53. 
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exercising their right to freedom of expression are all too familiar. 
Kaepernick was subjected to severe economic sanctions in the aftermath 
of his national anthem protest. For example, many sports commentators 
assert that NFL teams are imposing economic sanctions on Colin 
Kaepernick by not offering him a contract to play professional football.65 
Additionally, despite Kaepernick’s impressive NFL record,66 players with 
less skills and experience have been signed to NFL teams while 
Kaepernick remains unsigned, as none of the 32 NFL teams are willing to 
offer him a contract despite his free agent status.67 Although Kaepernick 
was subjected to much harsher consequences than student protestors, he, 
                                                                                                             
 65. See Ravens owner admits that Colin Kaepernick’s protest is a factor in 
whether to sign him, CETUSNEWS, http://www.cetusnews.com/news/Ravens-
owner-admits-that-Colin-Kaepernick’s-protest-is-a-factor-in-whether-to-sign-him  
.SJ_lefp3IZ.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2017) (providing that Baltimore Ravens 
owner admits that Colin Kaepernick’s national anthem protest is a factor in whether 
to offer him a contract) [https://perma.cc/GP7J-H887]. 
 66. Raphael Garcia, Colin Kaepernick Is Actually Better Than Many of the 
NFL’s First and Second-String Quarterbacks, COMPLEX SPORTS (Aug. 22, 2017), 
http://www.complex.com/sports/2017/08/kaepernick-is-better-than-most-quarter 
backs/ (“When compared to both starters and backups the trend is very clear: 
Kaepernick’s stats are stronger than many men who are scheduled to suit up this 
season. His completion percentage of 59.2 percent is higher than Jay Cutler, Blake 
Bortles, Ryan Fitzpatrick, and Cam Newton. His completion percentage also 
compares favorably against backups, as only Case Keenum, Matt Barkley, and 
Trevor Siemian recorded better percentages while appearing in at least six 
games.”) [https://perma.cc/D9ND-QZ59]. NFL teams have signed more than 30 
quarterbacks since Colin Kaepernick became a free agent, 19 of which have never 
completed a pass during an NFL regular season game. Considering Kaepernick 
has completed 1,011 passes, many fans posit that he has been blacklisted in 
response to his national anthem protest. For example, the Miami Dolphins choose 
to sign a white quarterback out of retirement with inferior statistics than 
Kaepernick. See Sean Gregory, ‘For Me, Its Personal.’ NFL Fans Boycott 
Football As Colin Kaepernick Goes Unemployed, TIME (Sept. 1, 2017), http://time 
.com/4924420/colin-kaepernick-nfl-football-boycott/ [https://perma.cc/J6JX-TV3 
M]. Thomas Lott, Atlanta NAACP calls for boycott of NFL, Falcons game over 
treatment of Colin Kaepernick, SPORTING NEWS (Aug. 19, 2017), http://www.sporting 
news.com/nfl/news/atlanta-naacp-boycott-nfl-falcons-colin-kaepernick/hkrlbvv9x0ff 
10maxkyzzrlu1 (“Some believe Kaepernick is being blackballed by owners after he 
opted out of his contract and became a free agent this offseason.”) [https://perma 
.cc/N7XT-6YMF]. 
 67. Christine Brennan, An unsigned Colin Kaepernick is a bad sign for NFL, 
USA TODAY (May 4, 2017, 2:15 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/co 
lumnist/brennan/2017/05/03/colin-kaepernick-free-agent-nfl-quarterback-national- 
anthem/101259582/ [https://perma.cc/9YKE-33LT]. 
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unlike the students, was afforded First Amendment protections and 
permitted to continue his national anthem protests.68  
As previously mentioned, a great deal of opposition by school 
administrators to student protests during the national anthem stems from a 
concern that allowing this symbolic speech teaches students to be 
disrespectful, especially in relation to honoring the men and women who 
have served in the military.69 It is a well-established American tradition 
and patriotic ritual to play the national anthem at sporting events and for 
spectators to stand to show respect for the flag and the soldiers who 
sacrificed their lives to uphold the freedom the American flag represents.70 
Therefore, kneeling—as opposed to standing—during the national anthem 
is considered disrespectful and offensive by many individuals in the 
military and the public at large, which encompasses some school 
administrators.71 For example, the principal of Lely High School in 
Naples, Florida informed students that any student-athlete who refuses to 
                                                                                                             
 68. Chris Yuscavage, HS and College Football Players Are Being Unfairly 
Penalized for National Anthem Protests, COMPLEX SPORTS (Oct. 11, 2017), 
http://www.complex.com/sports/2017/10/hs-college-football-players-penalized-for 
-kneeling-during-national-anthem (highlighting how high school and college 
football players are being punished unfairly for engaging in national anthem 
protests, unlike their NFL counterparts) [https://perma.cc/N4JG-N5DU]. 
 69. David B. Larter, Legendary SEAL Leader: National Anthem Protests 
Disrespect the Military, NAVY TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017), http://www.navytimes.com 
/news/your-navy/2016/09/09/legendary-seal-leader-national-anthem-protests-dis 
respect-the-military/ [https://perma.cc/P9GM-PNQZ].  
 70. See Mark Strasser, Establishing the Pledge: On Coercion, Endorsement, 
and the Marsh Wild Card, 40 IND. L. REV. 529, 534 (2007) (“‘[A]rising to a 
standing position upon hearing the national anthem being played,’ but merely ‘an 
act showing one’s respect for the government.’”). 
 71. Melissa Jacobs, Week Under Review: Don’t take Kaepernick’s protest as 
disrespect for military, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.si.com 
/nfl/2016/08/29/colin-kaepernick-national-anthem-protest-49ers [https://perma.cc 
/58VE-RG7K]; see also Kevin L. Burke, Sports and Patriotism: Why We Stand for 
the National Anthem, SPORTING NEWS (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.sporting 
news.com/nfl/news/sports-patriotism-national-anthem-protests-athletes-colin-kaep 
ernick/1u5n4asb5tujz138i101evbdju (“From MLB, the tradition spread to other 
sports throughout the United States. According to Ferris, sports fans adopted the 
military’s reverence for the anthem by standing to show respect for the flag.”) 
[https://perma.cc/SFT6-THSH]; 36 U.S.C. § 301 (2012) (“[A]ll other persons present 
should face the flag and stand at attention with their right hand over the heart, and men 
not in uniform, if applicable, should remove their headdress with their right hand and 
hold it at the left shoulder, the hand being over the heart; and (2) when the flag is not 
displayed, all present should face toward the music and act in the same manner they 
would if the flag were displayed.”). 
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stand during the national anthem would be removed from the game.72 The 
principal stated, “‘[W]hen that anthem is being played, you are to stand 
and you are to be quiet.”’73 
Likewise, a principal at a high school in Honolulu, Hawaii responded 
to students kneeling during the national anthem by issuing the following 
statement in a letter to the faculty and staff: 
The behavior of that small group of students was disrespectful to 
our school and our country. It was particularly unfortunate that this 
occurred over Memorial Day weekend, knowing that thousands of 
KS Kapalama family members, faculty, staff and alumni have 
served our country’s military to defend and uphold the freedoms we 
enjoy today.74 
These examples of school administrators’ reactions to student national 
anthem protests demonstrate the immense disparity in how schools 
respond to students’ social protests. Currently, students’ First Amendment 
rights in K-12 schools reside in a sea of ambiguity. The Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that students are considered “persons” under the 
Constitution and thus are entitled to fundamental rights, such as freedom 
of expression.75 The Court, however, marginalizes those same rights in 
subsequent decisions by permitting school authorities to limit freedom of 
speech under certain circumstances.76 Instead of safeguarding students’ 
constitutional freedoms, the Court has left the preservation of students’ 
rights to the discretion of overzealous school administrators who utilize 
the Court’s deference to usurp student rights under the guise of school 
                                                                                                             
 72. Carli Teproff, Principal to Students about the anthem: ‘You are to stand and 
you are to be quiet’, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 15, 2016, 10:17 PM), http://www.miami 
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 76. Id. at 1324. 
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order.77 Furthermore, there is no Supreme Court precedent that directly 
addresses what freedom of expression rights, if any, high school athletes 
have during school-sponsored sporting events. In light of the gross 
disparities in relation to whether students are disciplined for kneeling 
during the national anthem, it is of paramount importance to address the 
quandary surrounding the scope of students’ freedom of expression rights 
outside the traditional school learning environment.  
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION JURISPRUDENCE: K-12 PERSPECTIVE 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”78 In assessing whether students 
attending K-12 public schools have the constitutional right to engage in 
social protests during school-sponsored events, such as sports, one must 
examine freedom of expression jurisprudence.  
The First Amendment right to freedom of speech and expression is 
arguably one of the most cherished rights guaranteed by the Constitution.79 
As a nation built on democracy, citizens must be afforded the opportunity 
to express themselves freely without fear of repercussions in order to 
participate fully in the democratic process.80 Therefore, many legal 
scholars view First Amendment protections as one of the pillars of 
democracy.81 Although the express language of the Constitution only 
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democracy because democracy thrives under transparency and freedom of 
speech.”).  
 81. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Democratic First Amendment, 110 NW. U.L. REV. 
1097, 1102 (2016); Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Friends, Associates, and Associations: 
Theoretically and Empirically Grounding the Freedom of Association, 56 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 53, 66 (2014). 
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protects freedom of speech, several different categories of protected 
speech fall within its periphery.82 The Supreme Court has interpreted the 
broad language of the First Amendment to include protection of symbolic 
gestures and conduct because people often communicate ideas through 
both verbal and non-verbal means.83 Over the years, some justices have 
recognized two distinct types of speech in evaluating First Amendment 
protections: (1) pure speech, which is afforded the full protections of the 
Constitution; and (2) symbolic speech, which may receive only partial 
protections because it includes speech plus conduct.84 An example of pure 
speech is a protest or demonstration, whereas symbolic speech includes 
conduct such as burning a flag or kneeling during the national anthem to 
convey a particular message.85 The Court has established that when pure 
speech and symbolic speech are part of the same conduct, the government 
may limit First Amendment protections if there is an important 
governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element.86 For 
                                                                                                             
 82. Christopher Cavaliere, Category Shopping: Cracking the Student Speech 
Categories, 40 STETSON L. REV. 877, 879 (2011). 
 83. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court said, 
“Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of 
an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is 
a short cut from mind to mind.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 632 (1943). 
 84. McGoldrick, Jr., supra note 25, at 3–4 (“An example of symbolic speech 
in action is when David O’Brien burned his draft card to protest the Vietnam War. 
The Court assumed that the illegal act of destroying his draft card was symbolic 
speech, but unprotected because of the government’s overriding interest in 
protecting the Selective Service System . . . . And then there is mere conduct that, 
though expressive, receives no protection as speech at all and can be regulated for 
any rational reason.”); see also Amalgamated Food Emp.’s Union Local 590 v. 
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). The majority only referred to pure 
speech. Id. at 313 (“To be sure, this Court has noted that picketing involves 
elements of both speech and conduct, i.e., patrolling, and has indicated that 
because of this intermingling of protected and unprotected elements, picketing 
can be subjected to controls that would not be constitutionally permissible in the 
case of pure speech.”). The concurring opinion, however, referenced speech plus. 
Id. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Picketing is free speech plus, the plus being 
physical activity that may implicate traffic and related matters. Hence the latter 
aspects of picketing may be regulated.”). 
 85. McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 5. 
 86. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ( “[W]hen ‘speech’ 
and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element 
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”). The O’Brien 
Court emphasized the importance of distinguishing expressive conduct protected 
2017]  FROM HOODIES TO KNEELING DURING THE NATIONAL ANTHEM 165 
 
 
 
example, in United States v. O’Brien, the Court held that the First 
Amendment did not afford protection to the plaintiff’s act of burning his draft 
registration card in protest of the Vietnam War.87 The Court reasoned that 
although O’Brien’s symbolic speech was protected speech, the government’s 
important interest in prohibiting the destruction of registration cards justified 
narrowly construed limitations on O’Brien’s First Amendment freedoms.88 
The guiding principles set forth in O’Brien for ascertaining whether symbolic 
speech is protected under the First Amendment apply exclusively to adults.89 
Although children do not relinquish their constitutional rights while attending 
public schools,90 the Court employs a different constitutional framework for 
evaluating freedom of expression rights in K-12 schools.  
It is well established that students in K-12 schools possess First 
Amendment rights.91 The Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the 
                                                                                                             
by the First Amendment from conduct that is expressive, but is not afforded First 
Amendment protections. Id. The Court provided the following criteria to 
determine when a restriction on conduct that involved speech and nonspeech 
elements—that is, nonverbal expression—is constitutionally permissible: (1) the 
restriction is within the government’s constitutional powers; (2) the intent of the 
governmental actions is to pursue a legitimate governmental action; (3) the 
governmental interest is not related to restricting expression; and (4) the 
restriction that results is tailored narrowly to meet the government interest. See id. 
It is important to note that many legal scholars criticize the O’Brien Court for 
delineating between symbolic speech and conduct, arguing that it is impossible to 
make such a distinction. See Joshua Waldman, Symbolic Speech and Social 
Meaning, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1844, 1844–45 (1997); see also McGoldrick, Jr., 
supra note 25. 
 87. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77. 
 88. Id. at 376 (“The registration certificate serves as proof that the individual 
described thereon has registered for the draft. The classification certificate shows 
the eligibility classification of a named but undescribed individual. Voluntarily 
displaying the two certificates is an easy and painless way for a young man to 
dispel a question as to whether he might be delinquent in his Selective Service 
obligations. Correspondingly, the availability of the certificates for such display 
relieves the Selective Service System of the administrative burden it would 
otherwise have in verifying the registration and classification of all suspected 
delinquents.”). 
 89. The Court did not even reference the O’Brien Test in its Tinker decision. 
See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 90. Id. at 506 (“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. 
It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”). 
 91. Id. 
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community of American schools.”92 To this end, the Supreme Court has 
issued a series of decisions upholding students’ constitutional rights in K-
12 schools. The 1943 Supreme Court decision in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette provided the legal framework for assessing 
students’ First Amendment rights in K-12 schools for more than 25 
years.93 Barnette solidified not only students’ First Amendment right to 
free speech but also the right not to be compelled by school authorities to 
express adherence to a particular viewpoint.94 Although Barnette made a 
significant contribution to freedom of expression jurisprudence, the 
landmark Tinker v. Des Moines case and the subsequent trilogy of First 
Amendment cases provide a modern legal framework for free speech 
rights in today’s K-12 schools.95 Many scholars view Tinker as the 
pinnacle of student free speech protections because the Court granted 
unbridled First Amendment protections to students as long as their 
expression did not materially disrupt the school learning environment.96 
                                                                                                             
 92. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) 
(“[T]he First Amendment . . . does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy 
over the classroom.”); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“That they are 
educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of 
Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind 
at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government 
as mere platitudes.”). 
 93. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 94. Id. at 642, 644 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances 
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”). 
 95. Andrew D. M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student 
Expression, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 623, 626 (2002). 
 96. Sean R. Nuttall, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in 
Student Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1282, 1282 (2008) (“Scholars view 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District as the high-water 
mark of student speech protection and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions, 
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick (the Bong Hits case) as a considerable retreat 
from this mark.”); Abby Marie Mollen, In Defense of the "Hazardous Freedom" 
of Controversial Student Speech, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1502, 1506 (2008) 
(“The high water point for students’ First Amendment rights came in the first case 
directly on the question that the Supreme Court decided, Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District.”); Stephanie Klupinski, Getting Past the 
Schoolhouse Gate: Rethinking Student Speech in the Digital Age, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 
611, 618 (2010) (“Tinker is generally hailed by scholars as the high-water mark 
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The subsequent Supreme Court decisions incrementally diminished the 
Tinker Court’s stance regarding students’ free speech rights by carving out 
a series of exceptions that severely limited students’ free speech rights in K-
12 schools.97 The following discussion highlights the complex landscape of 
free speech jurisprudence in the context of K-12 schools. 
A. Mind to Mind Framework: West Virginia v. Barnette 
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the West 
Virginia Legislature amended a statute to require schools to offer courses 
in both history and civics for the purpose of “teaching, fostering, and 
perpetuating the ideals, principles and spirits of Americanism . . . .”98 The 
local Board of Education responded to the statutory amendments by 
adopting a resolution making the flag salute part of the regular school 
program and activities.99 The flag salute mandate required students to give 
a stiff-arm salute while reciting the Pledge of Allegiance out of honor and 
respect for the nation or be subjected to disciplinary action.100 Although 
the compulsory flag salute policy appeared neutral on its face, in practice 
it had a significant impact on certain groups of students because it 
conflicted with their religious beliefs.101 Two students at Slip Grade 
School in West Virginia, Marie and Gathie Barnette, refused to salute the 
flag because it conflicted with their religious beliefs as Jehovah’s 
Witness.102 As a result, the Barnettes and several other children who 
practiced the Jehovah’s Witness faith were expelled from school for their 
                                                                                                             
of student free speech”); Matthew Sheffield, Stop with the Exceptions: A Narrow 
Interpretation of Tinker for All Student Speech Claims, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. 
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 175, 176 (2011). 
 97. Aaron J. Hersh, Note, Rehabilitating Tinker: A Modest Proposal to 
Protect Public-School Students’ First Amendment Free Expression Rights in the 
Digital Age, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1309, 1321 (2013) (“While Tinker remains the 
foundational precedent of student free expression doctrine, it has not gone 
unchanged. The Supreme Court has invoked its underlying principles as guides in 
three subsequent decisions –Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick . . . . These opinions reflect 
a degradation of Tinker’s First Amendment principles . . . .”); Alison Hofheimer, 
Saved by the Bell? Is Online, Off-Campus Student Speech Protected by the First 
Amendment?, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 971, 976 (2013). 
 98. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625. 
 99. Id. at 626. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 629. 
 102. Id.  
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refusal to participate in the flag salute.103 Furthermore, the expelled 
children’s parents also experienced adverse consequences for their 
children’s religious stance.104 Many of the parents either were prosecuted 
or threatened with prosecution for violating state truancy laws, which 
categorize a child that is expelled as unlawfully absent, thus subjecting 
their parents or guardians to criminal penalties, including fines and 
imprisonment for up to 30 days.105 School authorities also threatened to 
send the children practicing the Jehovah’s Witness faith to reformatories 
for juvenile delinquents.106 The Barnettes, on behalf of their children and 
other citizens, responded to the harsh disciplinary actions by filing suit in 
district court, seeking an injunction to restrain the enforcement of the Board 
of Education’s flag salute mandate and regulations against Jehovah’s 
Witnesses attending West Virginia public schools.107 
Barnette exemplifies the ongoing struggle many courts experience as they 
attempt to strike a balance between constitutionalism and patriotism. The 
Barnette Court explicitly acknowledged that “the case is made difficult not 
because the principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag involved 
is our own.”108 Thus, although a member of the judiciary may feel a civic duty 
to uphold the principles of the Constitution, he also may feel a moral 
obligation to preserve socially-constructed notions of patriotism.109 Because 
the American flag is at the heart of the Barnette decision, dichotomizing 
personal and political allegiance from constitutional analysis is an arduous 
task. This moral quandary continues to persist more than 70 years after 
Barnette as school administrators attempt to reconcile the societal pressure of 
requiring student-athletes to stand during the national anthem while still 
preserving the athletes’ constitutional freedom of expression rights.110 
                                                                                                             
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 630.  
 105. Id. at 629; W. VA. CODE § 4904(4) (Supp. 1941). 
 106. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630. 
 107. Id. at 629. 
 108. Id. at 641. 
 109. See generally Ronald C. Den Otter, The Place of Moral Judgment in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 37 IND. L. REV. 375 (discussing the required 
constitutional analysis by judges in morally and factually complicated cases). 
 110. Russell, supra note 54 (“High school athletes, coaches and administrators 
across Maine are grappling with the increasingly bitter debate over whether 
kneeling during the national anthem is an acceptable form of protest.”); see also 
Scott Berson, These schools will punish athletes who protest the anthem. Is that 
against the law?, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 29, 2017, 10:02 AM), http://www.miami 
herald.com/news/nation-world/national/article176084591.html (highlighting the 
challenges school administrators, like Superintendent Scott Smith, face as they find 
themselves forced to choose between preserving students’ First Amendment rights 
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The Barnette decision served as the catalyst for a significant paradigm 
shift in First Amendment constitutional jurisprudence. In Barnette, the 
Supreme Court overruled earlier per curiam Pledge of Allegiance 
decisions, including the landmark Minersville School District v. Gobitis111 
decision, and held that a state no longer could infringe upon students’ First 
Amendment freedom of speech and religious rights under the guise of 
nationalism.112 The Court described symbolic speech as a “short cut from 
mind to mind” because it encompasses the use of a symbol to communicate a 
particular message.113 Although Barnette may be categorized as a free 
exercise of religion case, the Court emphasized that the students’ right not to 
speak was part of their First Amendment freedoms under the Freedom of 
Speech Clause; therefore, the state did not have the constitutional right to 
compel students to profess any particular matter of opinion.114 As Justice 
Jackson eloquently stated, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion 
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”115 
Although Barnette involved a religious rejection to a patriotic ritual 
school mandate, striking similarities exist between the flag salute mandate 
in Barnette and the modern-day school mandate for students to stand 
during the national anthem. First, in both scenarios students refused to 
follow a school mandate to participate in a patriotic ritual. In Barnette, the 
Jehovah’s Witness students refused to salute the flag and recite the Pledge 
of Allegiance; in the current education milieu, students are refusing to 
stand during the national anthem.116 Second, in both scenarios students 
asserted that their decision to engage or not engage in symbolic speech 
                                                                                                             
and requiring them to stand for the national anthem as a sign of respect for the 
United States) [https://perma.cc/V96Y-2QXL].  
 111. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (holding that a 
state statute requiring K-12 students to salute the national flag during their daily 
school exercises is constitutional). Justice Frankfurter, relying on substantive due 
process principles, reasoned that a state has a rational basis to require students to 
recite the Pledge of Allegiance and the allowance of any exemptions, including 
on religious grounds, would undermine school discipline and send a negative 
message to students about the importance of respecting the American flag. The 
Court further reasoned that a statute requiring a Pledge of Allegiance mandate in 
public schools is a rational means of teaching patriotism in schools. See id. 
 112. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642; John J. Concannon III, The Pledge of 
Allegiance and the First Amendment, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1019, 1030 (1989). 
 113. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632.  
 114. Id. at 633–34. 
 115. Id. at 642. 
 116. Id. at 628–29; see also discussion supra Part. I.B. 
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was protected under the First Amendment. Finally, both situations involve 
authoritative figures trying to reconcile the challenge of balancing 
students’ freedom of expression rights with fostering a spirit of patriotism 
among students. Based on these similarities, one can argue that students’ 
symbolic conduct of kneeling during the national anthem to protest police 
brutality is protected speech because Barnette clearly established that it is 
unconstitutional for the state to compel students to participate in symbolic 
speech or profess any particular matter of opinion.117 Therefore, one can 
infer that if it is impermissible for students to be compelled by the state to 
profess any particular matter of opinion, then students also may not be 
restricted from expressing their opinions through symbolic speech.  
B. The Gold Standard: Tinker v. Des Moines 
Tinker v. Des Moines is considered the cornerstone of freedom of 
expression jurisprudence in the context of K-12 schools.118 Tinker 
solidified the idea that children do not “shed their constitutional rights to 
freedom of expression or speech at the schoolhouse” door.119 This 
profound statement conveys the importance of recognizing and preserving 
the constitutional freedoms of students to the greatest extent possible while 
attending K-12 public schools. The central issue in Tinker was whether the 
prohibition of students wearing armbands in protest of the Vietnam War 
violated students’ First Amendment freedom of expression rights.120 The 
facts in this case involved a group of students who attended Des Moines 
public schools and who planned on wearing black armbands to school as 
a symbolic protest against the Vietnam War.121 The principals in the school 
district became aware of the planned student protests and adopted a policy 
banning students from wearing armbands to school.122 Under the new 
policy, a student found wearing an armband to school would be asked to 
remove it or be suspended from school until the student returned without 
the armband in compliance with the school policy.123 Despite knowledge 
                                                                                                             
 117. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 118. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at 
the Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 527 
(2000) (“Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District is the 
most important Supreme Court case in history protecting the constitutional rights 
of students.”). 
 119. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 120. Id. at 507–08.  
 121. Id. at 504. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.  
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of the school’s policy, students Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher 
Eckhardt wore the armbands to school.124 As a result, they were suspended 
from school and not permitted to return until either they complied with the 
policy or the period for the armband protest expired.125 A complaint was 
filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West 
Virginia on behalf of the students under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the 
United States Code, seeking an injunction to prevent the school district 
from disciplining the students for their symbolic expression.126 The district 
court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the students’ First 
Amendment freedom of expression rights were not infringed when school 
leaders forbade the students’ expression to prevent disturbing the school 
environment.127 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s decision.128 
In reviewing the appellate court decision, the Supreme Court relied 
heavily on the guiding principle that states and school officials should be 
afforded great deference to prescribe and control student conduct in schools 
as long as their actions are consistent with fundamental constitutional 
safeguards.129 The Court emphasized that “undifferentiated fear or 
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
expression,” but rather the expressive conduct must materially and substantially 
interfere with the school learning environment.130 In applying these guiding 
principles to the facts in Tinker, the Court opined that there was no indication 
that school authorities reasonably could forecast a material disruption of the 
school learning environment or a substantial disruption.131 To the contrary, 
no disruptions to the school environment occurred as a result of the student 
armband protests nor were there any efforts by the student protestors to 
infringe on the rights of others.132 Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, 
reasoned that although the students’ symbolic armband protest caused 
discussions to occur outside of the classroom, there were no instances of 
disorderly conduct or interference with classwork.133 Furthermore, the 
Court reasoned that unless school authorities can provide an evidentiary 
                                                                                                             
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 505.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 507.  
 130. Id. at 508. 
 131. Id. at 514. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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basis for constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students 
must be afforded their constitutional right to freedom of speech.134  
This landmark Supreme Court case established the Material 
Disruption Standard, which prohibits school authorities from infringing 
upon students’ freedom of expression rights unless such conduct causes a 
material and substantial disruption to the school environment.135 For many 
years the Tinker Material Disruption Standard has been the gatekeeper for 
students’ First Amendment rights in schools. The educational landscape, 
however, has changed immensely since the Court’s decision 48 years ago. For 
instance, some parents now are sending their children to charter schools or 
homeschooling them, bullying is more prevalent, and technology and the 
Internet are embedded heavily within school environments. Significant 
changes in education such as these have created formidable challenges 
as school leaders and lower courts express differing views regarding the 
appropriate application of the Tinker Material Disruption Standard in 
today’s schooling context.136 Although this Article focuses on revamping 
Tinker’s standard to provide better protections for students’ symbolic 
speech rights, it is important to note other areas of concern regarding 
Tinker’s effectiveness in safeguarding students’ First Amendment rights. 
For example, school leaders are unsure of their authority over student 
speech that occurs off-campus on social media sites, such as Facebook and 
                                                                                                             
 134. Id. at 511. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Rory Allen Weeks, Note, The First Amendment, Public School Students, 
and the Need for Clear Limits on School Officials’ Authority over Off-Campus 
Student Speech, 46 GA. L. REV. 1157, 1192–93 (2012) (“[C]ourts should not 
interpret Tinker so that it applies to all off-campus student speech that could 
offend other students or even devastate their well-being. By interpreting Tinker 
this way, school officials’ authority to regulate off-campus speech will be 
analogous to that which parents have over a visiting child.”); Shannon M. Raley, 
Note, Tweaking Tinker: Redefining an Outdated Standard for the Internet Era, 
59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 773, 775 (2011) (“[T]he Tinker standard cannot adequately 
encompass situations that arise in today’s Internet-centered world because a great 
deal of Internet-originated speech does not occur ‘on-campus’ and courts are 
unsure of what exactly constitutes a ‘substantial disruption’ as required by 
Tinker.”); Matthew I. Schiffhauer, Note, Uncertainty at the ‘Outer Boundaries’ 
of the First Amendment: Extending the Arm of School Authority Beyond the 
Schoolhouse Gate into Cyberspace, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 731, 733 
(2010) (advocating for the adoption of a new free speech standard for K-12 
schools to evaluate the constitutionality of student Internet speech. The proposed 
new standard integrates both prongs of Tinker to evaluate students’ constitutional 
rights in Internet speech cases). 
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Snapchat, yet causes a material disruption on campus.137 Additionally, 
school authorities are trying to reconcile the tension between peer sexual 
harassment law and students’ freedom of expression rights.138 Specifically, 
many school leaders are finding themselves in a doctrinal quandary when 
speech that is protected under the Tinker standard also triggers Title IX 
sexual harassment liability.139 All of the aforementioned issues regarding 
the application of Tinker’s Material Disruption Standard in today’s 
educational milieu illuminate the standard’s limited utility in today’s 
educational environment as well as the need to consider revising the 
standard to improve its effectiveness in safeguarding students’ First 
Amendment rights. 
C. Birth of Censorship: Bethel School District No. 43 v. Fraser 
Bethel School District No. 43 v. Fraser addresses an important area in 
freedom of expression jurisprudence in K-12 schools—administrative 
censorship of lewd or offensive speech.140 Although the Court in Tinker 
established that school authorities may not infringe upon the freedom of 
expression rights of students unless their conduct causes a material 
disruption to the school’s operation and discipline, the Court failed to 
address the appropriate action when a student’s conduct does not cause a 
material disruption but violates a school rule. The question remains 
whether students in K-12 public schools are granted unbridled freedom of 
expression rights as long as they do not cause a material disruption to the 
school learning environment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review Fraser to address this legal conundrum.  
In Fraser, a high school student, Matthew Fraser, was suspended from 
school for lewd remarks he made during a speech in which he nominated 
a classmate for student elective office.141 Fraser discussed the contents of 
                                                                                                             
 137. See supra note 96. 
 138. Lynn Mostoller, Freedom of Speech and Freedom from Student-on-
Student Sexual Harassment in Public Schools: The Nexus Between Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District and Davis v. Monroe County 
Board of Education, 33 N.M. L. REV. 533, 534 (2003). 
 139. Id. at 556–57. 
 140. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 141. Id. at 677. Fraser’s explicit speech stated: 
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, 
his character is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, the students 
of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds 
it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t 
attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until 
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the speech beforehand with two of his teachers, both of whom forewarned 
him that the content was inappropriate and that he would be in violation 
of the school’s offensive speech policy if he delivered the speech without 
making their suggested changes.142 Bethel High School’s disciplinary 
policy for inappropriate language stated that “[c]onduct which materially 
and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, 
including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.”143 Fraser 
delivered the speech without making any changes and was suspended for 
three days.144 Fraser challenged his suspension through the school 
district’s grievance process.145 The hearing officer, however, upheld the 
school’s disciplinary action, concluding that Fraser’s speech violated the 
school policy because it was lewd, indecent, and offensive.146  
Fraser’s father filed suit on his behalf in district court, alleging that the 
school’s disciplinary action violated Fraser’s First Amendment freedom 
of speech rights.147 The district court found that the school’s offensive 
speech policy was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and that the 
school’s disciplinary actions violated Fraser’s First Amendment freedom 
of speech rights.148 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court’s decision, rejecting the school district’s stance that 
disciplinary action is necessary to protect a captive audience of minors 
from being exposed to lewd and indecent speech.149 The Supreme Court, 
however, took a different stance and overruled the lower court decisions 
by holding that it is permissible constitutionally for school authorities to 
impose disciplinary sanctions upon students for lewd and indecent speech.150 
The Court addressed Fraser’s argument that his speech was protected under 
the Tinker Material Disruption Standard151 by distinguishing between the 
protected political speech from Tinker v. Des Moines and Fraser’s unprotected 
                                                                                                             
finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even 
the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. 
vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our high 
school can be.  
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 679 (majority opinion). 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 680. 
 150. Id. at 685. 
 151. Id. at 680–85; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 514 (1969); supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
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sexually explicit speech.152 Specifically, the Court asserted that the First 
Amendment does not protect the type of indecent and lewd language present 
in Fraser’s graduation speech because such discourse undermines the 
fundamental values that public schools are trying to instill among students, 
such as understanding socially appropriate behavior.153 The Court reasoned 
that Fraser’s use of sexually explicit language to an audience that included 
younger students demonstrated his lack of discretion in determining not only 
the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior but the potential harmful 
consequences of his actions.154  
Although the Fraser Court did not overturn Tinker, it did narrow 
substantially its reach by carving out an exception for lewd and offensive 
speech. For these reasons, one of the most profound proclamations made by 
the Fraser Court is that “the constitutional rights of students in public school 
are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.”155 
This statement diminishes the power behind the Tinker Court’s robust 
promulgation that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teachers 
shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”156 On the one hand, the Court is establishing the 
importance of not treating students as second-class citizens and preserving 
their constitutional protections to the greatest extent possible in K-12 school 
settings. On the other hand, the Court is undermining that very position by 
emphasizing that, although students maintain some constitutional protections 
in K-12 schools, they are not the full rights afforded to adults in other settings.  
A great deal of the Fraser decision’s scholarly critiques focus on the 
Court’s dramatic departure from Tinker’s speech-protective jurisprudence and 
the challenges associated with defining the scope of Fraser’s reach.157 Fraser 
is viewed as part of a growing trend of courts diminishing students’ free 
speech rights by affording school administrators greater deference in 
determining protected speech.158 As Justice Burger enunciated in Fraser, 
“The determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school 
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”159 It is this 
                                                                                                             
 152. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 686.  
 153. Id. at 681. 
 154. Id. at 683.  
 155. Id. at 682. 
 156. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 157. See Nina Zollo, Comment, Constitutional Law: School Has Broad Discretion 
to Prohibit Offensive Student Speech, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 193, 203 (1987). 
 158. David L. Hudson & John E. Ferguson, The Courts’ Inconsistent 
Treatment of Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 182 (2002). 
 159. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
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expansive discretionary authority granted to school administrators by the 
Fraser Court that has received the greatest criticism among free speech 
advocates who predict that the Court’s departure from Tinker’s speech-
protective jurisprudence will have a “chilling effect” on student free 
speech rights.160 In response to this prediction, Jonathan Pyle argues that 
Fraser should be overturned and the Tinker Material Disruption Standard 
should govern school censorship of student speech.161 If the Court had applied 
the Tinker standard in Fraser, as Pyle suggests, the outcome would have been 
considerably different because the facts in Fraser do not support Tinker’s 
requisite material disruption of the educational process to warrant infringing 
on students’ free speech rights.162 The likelihood of Fraser being overturned, 
however, is improbable in light of the current conservative make-up of the 
Court and the cases that preceded Fraser that support curtailing student free 
speech rights.163 Another area of scholarly critique of Fraser focuses on the 
intended scope of the standard. How broad is Fraser’s reach in terms of what 
lewd or offensive speech may be censored? Specifically, some scholars 
question whether lower courts should apply a broad application of Fraser that 
permits school authorities to censor any speech they deem lewd or offensive 
                                                                                                             
 160. See Zollo, supra note 157 (“By giving schools broad discretion, the 
instant Court ignores its own warnings of the chilling effects inherent in 
prohibiting speech offensive to some members of society.”); see also Therese 
Thibodeaux, Note, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser: The Supreme Court 
Supports School in Sanctioning Student for Sexual Innuendo in Speech, 33 LOY. 
L. REV. 516, 525 (1987) (noting that the Fraser decision represents a retreat from 
the Court’s “progressive stance” to the pre-Tinker ideology of allowing school 
authorities unbridled deference supporting the in loco parentis role of schools); 
Phoebe Graubard, Note, The Expanded Role of School Administrators and 
Governing Boards in First Amendment Student Speech Disputes: Bethel School 
District v. Fraser, 17 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 257, 271 (1987) (highlighting 
Fraser’s departure from Tinker’s expansive student free speech rights).  
 161. Pyle, supra note 23, at 633 (“[T]he Tinker disruption standard, and 
nothing more, should govern the school’s regulation of independent student 
speech.”). 
 162. Sara Slaff, Silencing Student Speech: Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 203, 217–18 (1987). 
 163. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (“[A] principal may, 
consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, 
when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”); see also 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (establishing that 
public school officials can censor school-sponsored expression for legitimate 
educational purposes). 
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or a narrower reading that only permits censorship of speech that is 
sponsored by the school.164  
The uncertainty surrounding the scope of Fraser is evident by the 
varied lower court interpretations of the standard articulated by the Court 
for censoring inappropriate speech. For example, in a Sixth Circuit case, 
Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, the court broadly interpreted 
Fraser to permit censorship of student expression that does not align with 
the school’s educational mission or conflicts with the fundamental values of 
public schools.165 This broad interpretation of Fraser enhances the school’s 
role as in loco parentis while simultaneously minimizing students’ free 
speech protections.166 In a similar case, however, the Second Circuit took a 
very different doctrinal stance and narrowly interpreted Fraser to permit 
school censorship for expression involving profanity or sexual innuendos 
only if it occurs during a school-sponsored activity.167 Thus, under the 
Second Circuit’s narrow interpretation of Fraser the focus is on the context in 
which the language occurred as opposed to whether the speech is lewd or 
offensive.168 The lack of consensus among the judiciary regarding the scope of 
Fraser illustrates the ongoing tension between affording school administrators 
enough discretionary power to maintain school discipline and order and 
preserving students’ free speech rights. This conundrum continues in the next 
                                                                                                             
 164. Hudson & Ferguson, supra note 158, at 191 (“The problem originates in 
the way Fraser is interpreted by some lower courts. The issue that has caused a 
split in the First Amendment’s application is whether Fraser allows schools to 
censor any speech deemed vulgar or offensive (broad reading), or whether Fraser 
only allows the regulation of speech that is sponsored by the school (narrow 
reading).”); see also Sarah Tope Reise, “Just Say No” to Pro-Drug and Alcohol 
Student Speech: The Constitutionality of School Prohibitions of Student Speech 
Promoting Drug and Alcohol Use, 57 EMORY L.J. 1259, 1287–88 (2008) 
(explaining that some courts reject a broad reading of Fraser because it essentially 
would overrule the principles set forth in Tinker. Specifically, Tinker’s disruption 
requirement is intended to prevent school authorities from prohibiting any 
expression simply because they find it disagreeable. Thus, a broad interpretation 
of Fraser would undermine this principle by allowing school authorities to 
circumvent Tinker’s Material Disruption Standard to censor protected speech 
unlawfully.). 
 165. Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 469–70 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 166. Reise, supra note 164, at 1279. 
 167. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 326 (2nd Cir. 2006) (“To summarize: 
Under Fraser, a school may categorically prohibit lewd, vulgar or profane language. 
Under Hazelwood, a school may regulate school-sponsored speech . . . . Speech 
falling outside of these categories is subject to Tinker’s general rule . . . .” (quoting 
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001))). 
 168. Id. at 326.  
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student free speech case before the Supreme Court, Hazelwood School 
District et al. v. Kuhlmeier.169 
D. Curriculum Matters: Hazelwood School District et al. v. Kuhlmeier 
The Court’s ruling in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 
represents yet another exception to Tinker’s Material Disruption Standard 
and permits school administrators to limit students’ freedom of expression 
rights, even in the absence of a material disruption.170 The Court in 
Hazelwood established that educators did not offend the First Amendment 
by exercising editorial control over the content of student speech so long as 
their actions were “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”171 
The facts in Hazelwood involve a group of students that challenged the 
constitutionality of a principal’s censorship of a student newspaper that was 
part of a student journalism class at Hazelwood East High School.172 Each 
semester, before the student newspaper went to print, page proofs had to be 
submitted to the principal for final approval.173 The students submitted the 
page proofs to the principal, who rejected two of the articles for publication.174 
In regards to the first article, the principal had privacy concerns regarding 
concealing the identity of the pregnant students featured in the article.175 
Additionally, the principal was concerned that some of the sexual references 
in the article were too advanced for some of the younger members of the 
student body.176 The second article rejected by the principal discussed the 
impact of divorce on students, in which a student criticized his father for not 
being around enough and made other negative comments regarding his 
parents.177 The principal reasoned that the parents should be allowed to 
respond to their son’s assertions prior to the article being published.178 As 
a result of a tight publication deadline, the principal decided not to publish 
the two articles of concern.179 The high school journalism students filed 
                                                                                                             
 169. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 170. Id. at 289. 
 171. Id. at 273. 
 172. Id. at 263. 
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 175. Id. at 265. 
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suit, alleging that the principal’s actions violated their constitutional free 
speech rights.180  
Hazelwood was the first student free speech case before the Supreme 
Court by which the Court critically evaluated students’ free speech rights 
in the context of school-sponsored activities.181 The Court, by a 5-3 vote, 
held that the principal’s censorship of the school-sponsored newspaper did 
not violate students’ free speech rights.182 The Court based its decision on 
a public forum analysis that evaluated whether the school newspaper may 
be categorized as a forum for public expression.183 The Court reasoned that 
the school newspaper could not be categorized as a public forum because 
the school never deviated from its policy that designated the student 
newspaper as part of the educational curriculum and not a vehicle for 
public expression.184 Significantly, the Court distinguished the speech at 
issue in Hazelwood from the speech in Tinker to illustrate the need to adopt 
a new standard governing students’ free speech rights in the context of 
school-sponsored curriculum activities.185 In Hazelwood, the Court 
considered the educator’s control over school-sponsored expressive 
activities, such as student newspapers, that might be perceived as bearing 
the “imprimatur of the school.”186 In Tinker, however, the Court’s inquiry 
examined whether it is constitutionally permissible for school authorities 
to limit a student’s individual freedom of expression that happens to occur 
                                                                                                             
 180. Id. at 264. Respondents filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Missouri. “The District Court concluded that school 
officials may impose restraints on students’ speech in activities that are ‘an 
integral part of the school’s educational function—including the publication of a 
school-sponsored newspaper by a journalism class—so long as their decision has 
‘a substantial and reasonable basis.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 181. Id. at 266–76. 
 182. Id. at 276. 
 183. William M. Howard, Constitutionality of Restricting Public Speech in 
Street, Sidewalk, Park, or Other Public Forum – Manner of Restriction, 71 
A.L.R.6th 471 (2012). It is well established in constitutional jurisprudence that 
content-based restrictions that occur in traditional public forums are subject to 
strict scrutiny. The government normally can impose only content-neutral time, 
place, and manner restrictions on speech in a public forum. Examples of public 
forums are city parks and sidewalks. See also Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum As 
A First Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech 
Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 722 
(2009) (“The traditional public forum doctrine content-based speech restrictions 
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 184. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 269. 
 185. Id. at 272. 
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in school.187 In evaluating the record, the Court concluded that educators 
should have the authority to censor free speech that is part of the 
educational curriculum to ensure that the speech is age-appropriate and 
accomplishes the desired learning objectives.188  
The Hazelwood decision, like many of the free speech cases following 
the Tinker decision, has been met with stark criticism from free speech 
advocates for carving out yet another exception that limits student 
speech.189 Constitutional law expert Erwin Chemerinsky asserts that the 
Hazelwood decision is historic because it ushers in a paradigm shift from 
Tinker’s speech-protective rhetoric to an authoritative approach that 
affords great deference to school authorities to punish student speech.190 
Chemerinsky’s assertion is supported by several other scholars who 
criticize the Hazelwood decision for diminishing students’ First 
Amendment rights by increasing the deference given to school authorities 
                                                                                                             
 187. Id. at 270–71 (“The question whether the First Amendment requires a 
school to tolerate particular student speech—the question that we addressed in 
Tinker—is different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a 
school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former question 
addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression that 
happens to occur on the school premises. The latter question concerns educators’ 
authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other 
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”); see also Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
 188. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272. 
 189. See, e.g., Frank D. LoMonte, "The Key Word Is Student": Hazelwood 
Censorship Crashes the Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 305, 306 
(2013) (“In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court carved out a category of ‘curricular’ 
speech that, in the majority’s view, was entitled to minimal First Amendment 
protection.”); Cavaliere, supra note 82, at 885 (“Whatever general rule the Court 
may have attempted to create in Tinker has been chiseled away by the Court’s 
subsequent student speech decisions. Now, whether a school may silence student 
speech depends on whether the speech falls within any one of four categories of 
unprotected expression: a school may limit student speech if it is disruptive under 
Tinker, ugly under Fraser, school sponsored under Hazelwood, or drug-
promoting under Morse.”); Shari Golub, Note, Tinker to Fraser to Hazelwood– 
Supreme Court’s Double Play Combination Defeats High School Students’ Rally 
for First Amendment Rights: Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 38 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 487, 504–05 (1989) (explaining that the Hazelwood Court “conveniently 
evaded” the “appropriate balance” struck by the Tinker Court.). 
 190. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The 
Deference to Authority, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 291, 292 (2013). 
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to limit free speech.191 For example, one scholar contends that Hazelwood 
undermines students’ First Amendment rights by allowing school 
authorities to use their discretionary power to categorize student speech 
freely and suppress it without any fear of judicial oversight.192 Some states 
have responded to the Hazelwood decision by passing legislation to extend 
students’ constitutional protections for school newspapers in hopes of 
avoiding a chilling effect on free speech.193  
E. Guiding the Moral Compass: Morse v. Frederick 
In Morse v. Frederick, the Supreme Court examined whether prohibiting 
students from displaying messages that support the use of illegal drugs during 
a school-supervised event violates the First Amendment.194 In Morse, 
students at Juneau-Douglas High School were permitted to observe the 
Olympic Torch Relay scheduled to proceed along the street in front of the 
high school as part of a school-sponsored event.195 This was a monumental 
event because it was the first time in American history that the Olympic 
Torch Relay passed through Alaska.196 Therefore, the principal reasoned 
that permitting students to leave class and observe the Olympic 
torchbearers from the street had educational value and allowed students to 
                                                                                                             
 191. Mark J. Fiore, Trampling the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The Case Against 
Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1929 
(2002) (“As a result of the Hazelwood decision, secondary schools have censored 
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 196. Id. at 434 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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be a part of a historic event.197 The controversy that ensued revolved 
around the plaintiff, Joseph Frederick, a senior at Juneau-Douglas High 
School.198 He and his friends decided to watch the Olympic Torch Relay 
across the street from the school.199 As the torchbearers and media crew 
passed by, Frederick and his friends unveiled a 14-foot banner that read 
“BONG HITS 4 JESUS.”200 Principal Morse demanded that the students 
take down the banner immediately because it promoted illegal drug use.201 
Every student complied except for Frederick.202 The principal confiscated 
the banner and instructed Frederick to come to his office.203 Frederick 
defiantly relinquished the banner and walked in the other direction.204 
Principal Morse suspended Frederick for ten days for violating the schools 
anti-drug policy by promoting illegal drug use during a school-sponsored 
activity.205 The school’s anti-drug policy stated: “The Board specifically 
prohibits any assembly or public expression that . . . advocates the use of 
substances that are illegal to minors.”206 Additionally, the school’s policy 
explicitly stated that “pupils who participate in approved social events and 
class trips” are subject to the disciplinary consequences for violating any 
such policies.207  
Frederick filed a suit in the United States District Court of Alaska 
against the school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that both the 
school board and principal violated his First Amendment rights.208 The 
district court ruled in favor of the principal and school board, finding that 
their actions did not violate Frederick’s First Amendment freedom of 
expression rights.209 The court reasoned that the principal was reasonable 
in interpreting the “BONG HITS 4 JESUS” banner as promoting illegal 
drug use, and, thus, disciplinary action was appropriate for Frederick’s 
violation of the school board’s anti-drug policy.210 The district court 
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emphasized that Principal Morse had the authority to stop such messages 
during a school-sponsored activity.211 The plaintiff appealed the district 
court’s finding that the principal’s actions did not violate his First Amendment 
rights.212 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that despite the banner advocating 
for illegal drug use, Principal Morse violated Frederick’s First Amendment 
rights because he preemptively disciplined Frederick without demonstrating 
that his symbolic speech was likely to cause a material disruption to the school 
activity.213  
The Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision by a 6-3 vote 
and held that the principal’s confiscation of Frederick’s banner, which 
promoted illegal drug use, was not a violation of his First Amendment free 
speech rights.214 The Court reasoned that schools must be permitted to 
regulate speech that encourages illegal drug use to students entrusted in 
their care.215 The Court found the principal’s response reasonable in light 
of Frederick’s actions of brandishing a pro-drug banner in front of his 
peers and the school staff at a school-sponsored event.216 The Court 
referenced the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act, which 
requires schools receiving federal funds to make a concerted effort to 
promote a drug-free environment.217 Therefore, the principal’s actions not 
only were reasonable but part of his responsibility in the management of 
the school.218 The Court also cited previous Supreme Court decisions that 
illuminated the important role schools play in deterring illegal drug use.219 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that schools should not be required to turn 
a blind eye to the promotion of illegal drug use under the auspices of First 
Amendment freedom of expression rights.220 
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The criticism of Morse has been especially harsh because the Court 
created more uncertainty in the already muddled waters of freedom of 
expression jurisprudence in schools. One scholar encapsulates what is 
described as the intellectual puzzle created by Morse for lower courts, 
citing four different possible interpretations of how to assess whether 
speech advocating drug use may be censored in schools.221 First, one may 
interpret that Justice Roberts created a narrow drug exception that permits 
limiting student speech that promotes illegal drug use.222 A second view is 
that the Morse Court simply applied the Tinker standard by finding that 
drugs constitute a material disruption to schools.223 A third interpretation 
of the legal standard put forth in Morse is that the Court expanded the 
authority of school administrators by permitting them to decide what 
qualifies as constitutionally protected speech in schools.224 Lastly, the 
fourth doctrinal interpretation of Morse is that although the decision did 
not overrule Tinker, it substantially restricted Tinker’s ability to protect 
student rights by carving out yet another exception to Tinker’s Material 
Disruption Standard.225 Although the aforementioned list of Morse 
interpretations are not exhaustive, the scholar’s critique illuminates the 
need for clarity regarding the proper application of the Tinker standard in 
regulating speech in K-12 schools. Some scholars have responded to the 
ambiguity in Morse by suggesting the adoption of a new four-part test for 
assessing the constitutionality of any censored student speech.226  
The Morse case illuminates the ongoing trend of courts struggling to 
protect students’ free speech rights without impeding school administrators’ 
ability to maintain a school environment conducive to learning. In light of 
the continuously changing contexts of today’s schools, courts likely will 
continue to face the endemic challenges associated with students’ free 
speech rights in K-12 schools.  
In sum, Barnette, Tinker, Hazelwood, Fraser, and Morse collectively 
create the framework for evaluating students’ free speech rights in K-12 
schools.227 Although Tinker’s speech-protective rhetoric was intended to 
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solidify students’ First Amendment rights in schools, it is evident by the 
Court’s dismantling of Tinker’s protections through a series of exceptions228 
that students shed a substantial portion of their First Amendment rights at the 
schoolhouse door.229 The impact of the current paradigm shift from speech-
protective rhetoric to speech-limiting rhetoric is especially apparent in the 
treatment of students’ symbolic speech in the context of national anthem 
protests. Instead of protecting students’ symbolic speech during national 
anthem protests, school authorities are using the discretionary power 
bestowed upon them by the Court to silence student voices.230 The 
aforementioned legal framework for protecting students’ free speech 
rights in K-12 schools does not adequately shield students participating in 
national anthem protests from impermissible encroachments on their 
constitutional rights. The existing legal framework for symbolic speech in 
schools must be evaluated and restructured to safeguard students’ rights. 
III. UNCHARTED WATERS: SAFEGUARDING 
STUDENTS’ FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 
The insurgence of student national anthem protests at school-sponsored 
athletic events has raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of existing free 
speech doctrine in safeguarding students’ First Amendment rights. The legal 
doctrine established in Tinker, Fraser, Morse, and Hazelwood concomitantly 
creates today’s modern legal framework for evaluating students’ free speech 
rights. The current free speech jurisprudence established in these cases, 
however, fails to provide students with adequate protection of their First 
Amendment rights, especially in the context of student national anthem 
protests. As a result, students across the country attempting to exercise 
their freedom of expression rights are being disciplined for kneeling 
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186 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
 
 
 
during the national anthem.231 This section highlights the shortfalls of 
existing First Amendment jurisprudence and charts a path forward to 
safeguarding students’ free speech rights in K-12 schools.  
A. Free Speech Shortfalls: A Call for Change 
The judicial decisions in Hazelwood, Fraser, and Morse do not 
provide any constitutional protections to students participating in national 
anthem protests. In all three cases, the Supreme Court carved out narrow 
exceptions that permit school authorities to censor student speech, none of 
which are applicable to the type of symbolic speech at issue in national 
anthem protests.232 For instance, the school-sponsored expressive activity 
addressed in Hazelwood is distinct from the extra-curricular sporting 
events at issue in national anthem protests. First, the school-sponsored 
activity in Hazelwood, a student newspaper, was part of the educational 
curriculum233 whereas school athletic teams are not a part of the 
curriculum. Second, the free speech at the center of the controversy in 
Hazelwood occurred during the regular school day234 whereas high school 
sporting events typically are held outside of the regular school hours, 
thereby removing any threat of a material disruption to the school learning 
environment.  
Although some individuals may argue that extra-curricular school 
athletic events are implicitly part of the educational curriculum—and thus 
should be analyzed under the aforementioned free speech jurisprudence—
because they are designed to teach values like teamwork, conflict 
management skills, and responsibility, those sentiments should be rejected 
adamantly. Student participation in extra-curricular activities, such as 
football, are voluntary activities in which students do not receive academic 
credit for participation and thus are outside the scope of Hazelwood. 
Furthermore, the performance of students who play on school-sponsored 
athletic teams are not part of the educational curriculum because their 
athletic performance is not used to evaluate academic achievement. 
Similarly, the Fraser standard is not applicable to national anthem protests 
because its narrow rule only permits school authorities to censor lewd and 
indecent speech.235 The symbolic speech students are conveying by 
kneeling during the national anthem is not lewd or indecent but rather 
political speech intended to communicate the need to address police 
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brutality against black Americans. Likewise, the Morse standard, which 
established that school authorities may regulate student speech that 
promotes illegal drug use during school-sponsored events, is distinct from 
the symbolic speech expressed in national anthem protests because the 
message is intended to speak out against police brutality, not promote 
illegal drug use.  
The speech-protective standard espoused in Tinker serves as a catch-
all for regulating students’ free speech rights in schools because the scope 
of First Amendment protections in Morse, Frazer, and Hazelwood are so 
limited.236 Despite Tinker’s speech-protective rhetoric, however, it too 
falls short of adequately safeguarding students’ First Amendment rights in 
schools. First, the Material Disruption Standard, as interpreted by the 
lower courts, gives too much deference to school authorities.237 Scholars 
like Professor Andrew Miller argue that school authorities have almost 
unbridled discretion in regulating student speech.238 The expansive 
deference given to school authorities is problematic, especially in the 
context of national anthem protests, because it fails to shield students from 
school authorities using their discretionary power to limit student speech 
simply because they disagree with the content of the message. For 
example, the principal of Lely High School in Naples, Florida mandated 
that students stand during the national anthem or be removed from athletic 
games.239 Similarly, students choosing to participate in national anthem 
protests were suspended at Doherty High School in Worcester, 
Massachusetts.240 Both instances demonstrate how affording school 
authorities too much deference allows them to engage in viewpoint 
discrimination, which is prohibited by the First Amendment.241 Thus, in 
the context of national anthem protests, the Tinker standard serves as a 
breeding ground for viewpoint discrimination because of the expansive 
deference given to school authorities. Viewpoint discrimination undermines 
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one of the key purposes of the First Amendment, which is to promote a 
marketplace of ideas.242  
The school environment should be a quintessential marketplace of ideas 
where students are trained on how to participate actively in democracy 
through vast exposure to robust exchanges of ideas that challenge and 
critique existing ideologies.243 This sentiment is captured in a prominent 
educational theory—“The Open Classroom Model”—in which students 
are introduced to objective conceptions of diverse perspectives and 
theories that allow them to critique the validity of the various positions.244 
According to this theory, the purpose of education is to equip students with 
the skills, knowledge, and critical thinking skills to make informed 
decisions and actively participate in democracy.245 This notion is 
illustrated in the following quote from Tinker: “Students may not be 
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses 
to communicate.”246 Therefore, student national anthem protests to express 
opposition to the treatment of black Americans in the United States, 
particularly by police officers, contribute to the marketplace of ideas 
regarding minority relations and critique existing practices. The students 
like Kaepernick are exercising their constitutional right to participate 
actively in public discourse and the free exchange of ideas. It is illogical 
to acknowledge Kaepernick’s right to freedom of expression yet allow the 
State to deny citizens-in-training—students—the same opportunity. 
Because school sporting events are open to the general public, it is more 
difficult for school officials to filter what types of political and social 
messages students receive from spectators. Therefore, notions of equity 
demand that students, like sporting event attendees, are permitted the same 
constitutional freedoms to express themselves freely as long as they are 
not infringing on the rights of others. Moreover, it is well established in 
First Amendment jurisprudence that students are considered “persons” 
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under the Constitution both in an outside of school.247 Therefore, students 
should be afforded the same level of constitutional protections as adults to 
the greatest extent possible. As the Court stated in Tinker, “Students in 
school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They 
are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as 
they themselves must respect their obligations to the State.”248 
Because democracy and free speech are inextricably linked, laws must 
be developed that safeguard free speech rights in our nation’s public 
schools. One scholar has supported this notion by stating that “[i]nstead of 
offering them the government of ‘The Brave New World,’ young people 
need help to empower themselves. It’s not enough for the coming 
generation to know old ideas, they must be able to develop their own.”249 
This goal can be accomplished only by prioritizing the preservation of 
students’ free speech rights in K-12 schools and dismantling efforts to 
stifle the free exchange of ideas. The vigilant protection of First 
Amendment freedoms is nowhere more vital than our nation’s public 
schools.250 For these reasons, the current Tinker standard needs to be 
revamped to better protect students’ free speech rights.  
B. Tinker-Spence Standard: A New Constitutional Standard for Free 
Speech in K-12 Schools 
The proposed new K-12 standard applies the full protections of the 
Spence Test251 for student-initiated symbolic speech during non-academic, 
school-sponsored events. The Spence case is part of numerous symbolic 
speech cases that provide a framework for First Amendment freedom of 
expression jurisprudence.252 Currently, the criterion established to 
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determine protected speech in Spence v. Washington is used exclusively 
in the context of adult freedom of expression cases and is thus not 
applicable to K-12 settings.253 The Spence Test, however, is a great starting 
point for developing a new constitutional standard to ensure that students’ 
freedom of expression rights are protected in K-12 schools because it is 
considered the seminal case in symbolic speech. In Spence, the defendant 
displayed an upside-down flag with a peace symbol affixed on both sides 
outside his apartment window in protest of the killings at Kent State 
University and the invasion of Cambodia during the Vietnam War.254 
Three police officers observed the flag and arrested the defendant for 
violating the Washington Flag-Desecration Statute, which made it a 
misdemeanor to place “any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing 
or advertisement” upon the flag of the United States and to display such 
flag in its superimposed state.255 At trial, the defendant argued that he used 
black tape intentionally to affix the peace symbol to the flag so it could be 
removed without damaging the flag.256 He asserted that because he did not 
damage the flag, he was not in violation of the statute.257 Furthermore, the 
defendant contended that the flag desecration statute was an impermissible 
violation of his First Amendment rights because it was overbroad on its 
face and, thus, invalid.258 The lower court rejected the defendant’s 
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argument and sentenced him to jail and a fine for violating the statute.259 
The defendant unsuccessfully appealed the trial court decision to the 
Washington Supreme Court, which upheld the defendant’s conviction and 
rejected any claims to free speech rights.260 The Washington Supreme 
Court reasoned, “The statute does not purport to inhibit speech of any kind 
whether actual or symbolic, printed or auditory; it merely says that one 
cannot use the flag of the United States as the material upon which to print his 
utterance.”261 This victory for the State of Washington, however, was short 
lived.262 The Supreme Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court decision, 
ruling in favor of the defendant.263  
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court focused on ascertaining 
whether the conduct “was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication 
to fall within the scope of the First . . . Amendment[].”264 To this end, the Court 
for the first time attempted to define which symbolic acts are protected under 
the First Amendment.265 Prior to the Spence case, there was pervasive 
uncertainty among the lower courts regarding how to delineate which 
symbolic acts are protected under the First Amendment.266 In response to 
the split in the circuit courts, the Spence Court established that the 
following criteria must be met for a determination that symbolic speech is 
protected under the First Amendment: (1) the actor/speaker intends to 
convey a particular message; and (2) it must be likely that those who 
witness the activity will understand what the speaker intends to convey by 
his or her behavior.267 These criteria, combined with the Tinker Material 
Disruption Standard, serve as the guiding principles for the proposed new 
constitutional standard for evaluating whether a student’s symbolic speech 
is protected under the First Amendment.  
Under the proposed Tinker-Spence Standard, student symbolic speech 
qualifies for First Amendment protections if all of the following occur:  
(1) The actor/speaker intends to convey a particular message;  
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(2) Those who witness the activity likely understand what the 
speaker intends to convey by his or her behavior; 
(3) Symbolic speech does not interfere with the rights of others; 
and 
(4) Symbolic speech does not involve peer coercion of other 
students to participate. 
Applying the Tinker-Spence Standard to the student protests during 
the national anthem, the symbolic speech communicated through kneeling 
would be protected constitutionally because the student intends to convey 
a message—stop police brutality against black American males—and 
those who witness the symbolic conduct—individuals attending/watching 
the sporting event—understand what the student intends to communicate 
through his actions. The symbolic speech does not interfere with the legal 
rights of other students or spectators attending the event. To the contrary, 
national anthem protests are a form of symbolic speech that the First 
Amendment encourages and was designed to protect.268 Whether school 
authorities agree or disagree with the symbolic message being conveyed 
through the national anthem protests is irrelevant. Adopting the Tinker-
Spence standard promotes a long-held tradition of promoting free speech 
by encouraging the exchange of diverse ideas and perspectives. Lastly, as 
long as the student conveying the symbolic message does not try to coerce 
other students to participate, the conduct should be afforded the full 
constitutional protections of the First Amendment. The last factor—the 
symbolic speech does not involve peer coercion to participate—is important 
because it protects students from being subjected to peer pressure to convey 
a particular message, which, in the context of national anthem protests, is a 
message in opposition to the mistreatment of black Americans. It is crucial 
not only that we protect students’ constitutional rights to convey a message 
through conduct but also safeguard non-participating students from being 
coerced into communicating a particular message.  
Additionally, the Tinker-Spence Standard should be adopted because 
it accounts for the special characteristics of schools by requiring that 
students’ symbolic speech not involve coercing peers into participation 
nor interfere with the rights of others. One of the special characteristics of 
K-12 schools is that they contain youths that are vulnerable to peer 
pressure because of their developmental stage. The proposed new 
constitutional standard safeguards students’ symbolic speech rights, such 
as participating in national anthem protests, while protecting their peers 
from being compelled to speak by participating in the protest. Just as 
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students should not be compelled by school authorities to stand for the 
national anthem, which is a form of symbolic speech, their peers should 
not be coerced into kneeling in protest for the national anthem. 
The proposed Tinker-Spence standard also should be adopted because 
it bridges the doctrinal gap between Tinker and Spence, thereby providing 
stronger First Amendment protections for students’ symbolic speech. The 
new standard protects students from school authorities using the court’s 
deference to legitimize viewpoint discrimination, such as prohibiting 
national anthem protests, by eliminating the application of Tinker’s 
Material Disruption Standard to extra-curricular activities. One scholar 
suggests addressing concerns about Tinker serving as a conduit for 
viewpoint discrimination by modifying Tinker’s existing framework to 
deter viewpoint discrimination.269 Specifically, the scholar contends that 
speech restrictions under Tinker should be tailored narrowly to achieve a 
legitimate governmental purpose to reduce the risk of viewpoint 
discrimination.270 The Tinker-Spence test is a better solution, however, 
because it addresses the need to minimize the deference given to school 
authorities to regulate student speech. Under the proposed Tinker-Spence 
standard, whether the government has a legitimate interest in censoring 
student symbolic speech is irrelevant. Furthermore, Tinker’s Material 
Disruption Standard never should have applied to non-curricular school 
activities because it minimizes students’ free speech protections.271 Any 
standard governing free speech rights in schools should balance students’ 
rights and the ability of school authorities to maintain an environment 
conducive to learning. This proposed standard accomplishes that goal.  
In addition to addressing all of the aforementioned shortfalls in 
Tinker’s Material Disruption Standard, the proposed new standard 
provides students with the full protections of the Spence Standard that is 
applied in adult contexts. Under this new standard, students are afforded 
the same constitutional protections as Kaepernick, as long as the students’ 
symbolic expression does not interfere with the rights of others or involve 
peer coercion. Because students are considered “persons” under the 
Constitution,272 courts should strive to afford them with the same free 
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speech protections to the greatest extent possible. The proposed Tinker-
Spence standard accomplishes this goal.  
C. Limitations of Proposed Tinker-Spence Standard 
Despite the laudable intentions behind the endorsement of this new 
constitutional standard, it is important to acknowledge the potential 
limitations and negative outcomes that may result from the adoption of 
this standard. First, there is a potential negative economic effect on K-12 
schools. Many sports spectators may take the stance that they are 
purchasing a ticket to view the game and not a political protest.273 Because 
kneeling during the national anthem is considered disrespectful to the 
military, allowing students to engage in this type of symbolic conduct may 
result in boycotts and loss of sponsorships.274 Second, affording student-
athletes the full constitutional protection to engage in social protests 
during the national anthem also may increase the likelihood of violence at 
school sporting events because of hostile responses from those in 
opposition to symbolic acts. For example, members of the Beaumont 
Bears little league team were subjected to racial slurs and death threats for 
kneeling during the national anthem at a football game.275 Therefore, 
safeguarding student rights to engage in social protests during the national 
anthem, even if it causes a material disruption, may result in increased 
costs to schools for additional security.  
Despite the possibility of material disruptions, the preservation of First 
Amendment rights is so integral to the fabric of our nation that democracy 
demands that these rights are not limited simply to appease the sentiments 
of those in opposition. Embracing diverse viewpoints and perspectives is 
one of the foundational elements of democracy. Therefore, we must 
protect those rights fervently. Lastly, although the proposed standard 
prohibits any form of peer coercion to communicate a particular message, 
peer pressure and K-12 schooling are inextricably linked.276 It is well 
established in social science literature that peer groups have a tremendous 
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influence on students’ attitudes and behaviors.277 Despite these limitations, 
the benefits of the Spence-Tinker standard supersede any disadvantages.  
CONCLUSION 
Public schools play the most critical role in preparing youth for 
democratic participation and citizenship.278 One of the goals of public 
education is to encourage civic participation by imparting students with the 
skills, knowledge, and fundamental values necessary for the preservation of 
our democratic system.279 At the heart of these goals is providing students 
with the opportunity to engage in political involvement by participating in 
simulations of democratic structures and processes, such as social protests.280 
Therefore, it is crucial to implement constitutional safeguards through the 
adoption of the Tinker-Spence standard to shield students from violations of 
their constitutional freedom of expression rights and to help preserve civic 
education in K-12 schools. Ideally, schools should mirror the society in 
which students live to adequately prepare the youth for adulthood. How can 
students be expected to engage actively as citizens without the opportunity 
to practice their civic and political skills? The Tinker-Spence standard 
ensures that the creed set forth by the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines281 is 
honored—that students do not shed their constitutional rights at the 
schoolhouse door. One of the primary purposes of the First Amendment is 
to protect individuals from having their rights infringed upon by private and 
public citizens.282 To deny children the same constitutional rights afforded 
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to adults goes against the spirit and purpose of the Constitution. As one 
scholar correctly noted, 
Any word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, 
that deviates from the views of another person may start an 
argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we 
must take this risk, and our history says that it is this sort of 
hazardous freedom--this kind of openness--that is the basis of our 
national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans 
who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often 
disputatious, society.283 
Society must be relentless in its fight to protect the freedom of expression 
rights of future citizens. Democracy depends upon it. 
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